AN EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT

Prepared by

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Introduction

1. Project Goal and Purpose

To what degree has the $1.6 million Development of Democratic Institutions Project (DDI, project no. 398-0375), funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through a cooperative agreement (No. ANE-0375-A-00-1027-00) with America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, Inc. (AMIDEAST), succeeded in its purpose of (in the words of the agreement) "expand[ing] AMIDEAST's organizational capacity to undertake the design and implementation of political and legal programs which will significantly contribute to the" project's goal of "strengthen[ing] the capability of governments and private institutions in the Near East to undertake democratic political and legal development initiatives"? This is the central question examined by the evaluation that constitutes this report.

In addition to the primary capacity-building purpose identified above, the cooperative agreement states that "within three years, AMIDEAST hopes to establish largely self-financed in-country DPI [USAID Democratic Pluralism Initiatives] programs using funds which might be provided by A.I.D." This implies an objective that DDI progress will help AMIDEAST achieve financial sustainability for the organization's post-DDI democratic development activities. (However, as discussed below, interpretations of what was expected of AMIDEAST in this regard vary.) The issue of financial sustainability, then, also is a focus of this report, as is the multi-faceted question of future courses of action for USAID and AMIDEAST.

2. The Evaluation Team and Report

This report was prepared by a three-person evaluation team headed by Stephen Golub, an attorney and democratic development consultant, and also composed of Richard Whitaker of USAID's Bureau for Asia and Near East (ANE) and Joseph Schechla, Director of AMIDEAST's DDI technical unit. James Dempsey and Susan Morawetz of the ANE Bureau also provided valuable input into the document. Mr. Golub prepared the initial draft of Sections I (Executive Summary) and V (Looking Toward the Future) of this report; Mr. Schechla the initial draft of Section II (An Overview of DDI's Structure and Activities) and Mr. Whitaker the initial draft of Sections III (The Impact of DDI on AMIDEAST's Capacity to Design and Implement Democracy Programs) and IV (DDI Program Sustainability). Subsequent consultations among the team

members and with Mr. Dempsey and Ms. Morawetz resulted in revisions of the drafts, as did Mr. Golub's editing of the document as a whole.

The report is based on: meetings in Washington with appropriate USAID and AMIDEAST personnel during the week of March 20, 1995; travel to Yemen and Jordan from March 24 through April 8, 1995, where the team met with government officials, political scientists, journalists, NGO leaders, AMIDEAST and USAID personnel, and a Jerusalem-based AMIDEAST staff member who traveled to Amman for discussions with the team; long-distance telephone interviews conducted by Mr. Golub with AMIDEAST, USAID and other U.S. Government (USG) personnel based in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Jerusalem after Mr. Golub returned to the United States, during the period of April 18-29, 1995; and questionnaires prepared by the team and completed by Near Eastern beneficiaries of and participants in DDI-supported activities.

Section II of this document provides an overview of activities connected with DDI. Section III and IV respectively assess the issue of capacity-building and financial sustainability. Finally, Section V looks at lessons learned through DDI and through other democratic development experience, and provides thoughts and suggestions for the future. These pertain to: priorities for democratic development (DD) assistance; how USAID could best work with DD intermediary organizations in the future; how AMIDEAST could best pursue further work in the DD arena; financial considerations pertaining to AMIDEAST's future DD activities; and possible DDI close-out activities that could further strengthen AMIDEAST's democratic development capacity.

The inclusion of AMIDEAST and USAID representatives as equal partners in the evaluation team was undertaken as part of a participatory approach through which diverse perspectives could be shared. Given that diversity, this report should be seen as representing consensus on some issues and compromise on others.

In addition, the closing section of this Executive Summary contrasts alternative viewpoints regarding certain issues pertaining to DDI, rather than passing final judgment on them. This approach aims to illuminate matters that AMIDEAST and USAID should address through the follow-up discussions that the report suggests constitute part of DDI's close-out activities. It is in keeping with the view of experienced democratic development practitioners that an evaluation is much more valuable as a learning tool geared toward improving the future work of all parties involved, as opposed to simply constituting the terminal event of a project. This approach also recognizes that certain issues require a much more thorough exchange of perspectives than this report can provide.

3. DDI Structure, Financial Data and Staffing

In accordance with DDI's project design, AMIDEAST located its DDI technical unit at the organization's Washington headquarters. The unit coordinates its work with USAID/Washington and with the six AMIDEAST country offices selected for the project under the cooperative agreement: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon. DDI was designed to support the full-time work of the three-person DDI unit, and to support 10 percent of the six AMIDEAST country directors' time. On the implementation side, the DDI technical unit and the AMIDEAST field offices have focused on local partner institutions in the legislative, judicial and NGO sectors in the six countries.

The July 26, 1991 cooperative agreement with USAID provided AMIDEAST with $1.6 million. It was originally slated to operate through December 31, 1994. The agreement's

Amendment Number 1, dated December 20, 1994, extended that expiration date to December 31, 1995, and modified its financial plan (i.e., budget). The original financial plan consisted of: an administrative budget of $1,093,000, its largest components being staffing (mainly for the time of the DDI technical unit in AMIDEAST's Washington headquarters and 10 percent of selected AMIDEAST country directors' time), fringe benefits, overhead and G&A; and a program budget of $507,000 for specific "seed" activities (divided along the lines of $207,000 for Tunisia, $100,000 for Lebanon and $200,000 for other countries).

Amendment Number 1 modified the financial plan so that the administrative budget was increased to $1,283,765 and the program budget decreased to $316,234 (divided along the lines of $71,265 for Tunisia, $113,142 for Lebanon and $131,827 for other countries). Minor subsequent adjustments in completed expenditures and obligated funds have increased the projected program budget slightly to $317,437.

B. Main Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Organizational Capacity to Undertake Democratic Development Programming

a. DDI achieved modest success in building up AMIDEAST's capacity to undertake democratic development programming, often in the face of obstacles beyond AMIDEAST's control. These accomplishments occurred mainly through ongoing contact between the DDI technical unit's director and the field staff; through a relatively limited number of hands-on program ("seed") activities undertaken in the field; and through experience with activities that were not actually DDI-funded, but which the DDI technical unit helped formulate and launch. Especially in view of the importance of their position, the two individuals who have served as heads of the unit seem thoughtful and qualified. In addition, AMIDEAST field staff appear to have developed sound knowledge of those selected aspects of democratic development programming with which they have been heavily involved (e.g., management of country assessment teams, parliamentary computerization and parliamentary staff computer training). Such knowledge built on a base of indigenous contacts and political astuteness regarding the countries within which they operate--though these factors spring much more from their overall experience in those societies than from DDI.

b. Despite this modest success, DDI was overly Washington-centered and should not be replicated in this exact form. Given that field personnel should be a primary focus of any effort to build up an organization's capacity to conduct democratic development work, DDI fell short in that the balance of expertise, activity and funding was centered in Washington. In this important sense, the project worked at cross-purposes to a central rationale for awarding DDI to AMIDEAST, which was that it has a network of field offices throughout the Near East.

c. Though this Washington-centered approach should not be replicated, its roots regarding DDI are understandable. These roots include the relative newness of democracy/governance (D/G) programming for USAID at the time of DDI's inception, the fact that much of the impetus within USAID for D/G work at that time (perhaps particularly with respect to the Near East) originated in Washington, and the resulting reality that the substantial involvement of USAID/Washington required a senior AMIDEAST interlocutor nearby.

d. The cooperative agreement did not provide for, and the DDI unit did not undertake, any structured array of training, exposure, interaction among field offices or other endeavors that could have helped cultivate field personnel's thinking about and understanding of relevant issues and strategies. While USAID field personnel consulted by Mr. Golub generally were supportive of AMIDEAST and the DDI unit's efforts, a few did not feel that DDI had significantly strengthened AMIDEAST's field staff's capacities regarding democratization. The Washington-focused nature of DDI accordingly raises the question of whether too much of the organization's expertise will disappear if the current DDI Program Director leaves AMIDEAST.

e. Another factor that hampered DDI boils down to the fact that, to put the matter colloquially, too many cooks spoil the broth. Both in Washington and the Near East, a wide array of USG personnel have been involved with both major and minor DDI-related decisions, at times resulting in conflicting guidance and instructions for AMIDEAST. This has largely been a result of high staff turnover and several reorganizations within USAID generally and the Near East Bureau in particular during the life of DDI; the need for both field and Washington approval on activities (by nature of the project structure); and the tendency for some Embassies to actively engage in decisions regarding USAID programs that involve democracy promotion. It is important to emphasize that each individual involved has sought to provide useful advice that would, in his or her view, advance democratic development. But the net result has been that DDI has been stymied or pulled in inconsistent and even counterproductive directions. We should note, nevertheless, that AMIDEAST field offices' relationships with most USAID missions have been positive.

f. DDI also has been hampered by other exogenous factors, such as a civil war in Yemen and the fact that the Jordan-Israel peace process, for all of its potential benefits, has contributed to a much more sensitive programming environment in Jordan.

g. In terms of factors at least partly within AMIDEAST's control, DDI's impact on field personnel would have been greater if the $507,000 of program funds originally in the project budget had been fully utilized, rather than redirected in part to the administrative budget so that only a projected total of $317,437 will be spent on program activities by the end of DDI. This appears to be, at least in part, a shortcoming of AMIDEAST. Again, however, not all decisions regarding the use of these funds were in AMIDEAST's complete control. On the other hand, in perhaps the most notable instance where a proposed activity was vetoed, USAID personnel consulted by Mr. Golub in the course of his telephone interviews presented sound arguments for why they reacted negatively to an initiative that would have established a regional computer network for women's NGOs. Weighing those arguments and counter-arguments is beyond the scope of the team's work.

h. In discussions with USAID personnel, the team repeatedly heard references to the opinion that DDI aimed to make AMIDEAST into the Near Eastern equivalent of The Asia Foundation (TAF), which undertakes democratic development work in Asia. For the most part, it is not appropriate to compare the two, in that TAF receives an annual appropriation from Congress that it has considerable leeway to utilize. In addition, unlike AMIDEAST, TAF focuses mainly on democratic development and related concerns, and operates in nations which, for the most part, offer more open programming environments than the Near East. However, the respects in which TAF does serve as a somewhat useful model are that its expertise, decisions and programming impetus are very much field-based; that the bulk of its activities are in-country in nature; and that it

builds on its field experience to develop an independent perspective in proposing potential projects for USAID support.

i. Political will is a final, critical issue that merits scrutiny with respect to both DDI in general and the particular country initiatives that the team reviewed in some detail. As emphasized in USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation report regarding Rule of Law programming (Blair and Hansen 1994) and as applied to more general D/G work, it is essential to constantly examine whether the governments with which a development organization works (or is trying to influence through the strengthening of civil society organizations) have the political will to change. Some USAID staff have voiced concern about AMIDEAST choices and capacities along these lines.

There is some merit to this concern, but the issue of whether and how well AMIDEAST assesses political will for reform, and of which governmental and nongovernmental leaders really possess it, nevertheless is a complicated matter. AMIDEAST field staff have the country background and knowledge to undertake such assessments. They have tended to do so in only a narrow sense, however, reflecting at best a very limited DDI impact on their capacities in this regard. The limitations on this impact in turn flow from the structure of DDI and the question (addressed in more detail below) of whether AMIDEAST was supposed to lead or follow USAID's thinking regarding democratic development.

2. Financial Sustainability

a. It is too early to know whether the DDI unit will be fully sustained by non-DDI funds by the end of the project. The team heard different points of view regarding whether AMIDEAST was expected to achieve this goal. In any event, we do not read the cooperative agreement as mandating this. The relevant language in the agreement states that "AMIDEAST hopes to establish largely self-financed in-country programs using funds which might be provided by A.I.D." This ambiguous wording does not firmly commit AMIDEAST to fully replace the DDI unit's funding with support from non-DDI sources.

b. AMIDEAST has made definite progress toward financial sustainability for its democratic development operations. And whether the DDI unit continues in the same form is less important than AMIDEAST's continued involvement in democratic development work. Nevertheless, we should note that the progress flows mainly from (non-DDI) USAID support, and that raising funds from foundations and other private sources has proven highly problematic for AMIDEAST.

c. The development of proposals aimed at expanding AMIDEAST's democratic development portfolio has involved a great investment of staff time and AMIDEAST financial resources. They accordingly represent a significant part of AMIDEAST’s contribution to the sustainability of the DDI unit. This raises the question, however, of whether some resources devoted to preparing proposals for prospective AID grants and contracts could and should be put into pilot field activities that, over the long run, would enable AMIDEAST to gradually build up greater democratic development expertise and a relevant track record to present to USAID and other donors. This issue should be addressed in the AMIDEAST-USAID discussions suggested below as a DDI close-out activity.

3. Looking Toward the Future

a. Any future USAID efforts to strengthen the capacities of intermediary organizations [1] (such as AMIDEAST) should focus primarily on building up the knowledge and experience of field-based personnel and (as a secondary priority) other staff in key program areas, rather than merely providing general support for staff salaries.

b. Furthermore, any future efforts to strengthen an intermediary organization's democratic development capacities should plan at the outset what capacities will be strengthened and how this will be done.

c. Whether USAID undertakes any future projects that seek to bolster an intermediary organization's democratic development (DD) capability or simply aims to support democratic development through an intermediary, the project should maximize the flexibility and independence that it provides that organization. Perhaps the best way to do this is to: support the organization through a grant that, as already emphasized, concentrates funding in the field offices as opposed to Washington; and give the grantee's field offices the leeway to decide how to spend the funds, subject to a "no objection" review by USAID missions. Such an approach and variations on it, which USAID has employed in sensitive programming environments outside the Near East, preserves USAID's ultimate oversight while minimizing well-intentioned but ultimately counterproductive intrusion by a diversity of personnel with varying and even conflicting perspectives.

d. To the extent that resources permit, AMIDEAST should try to build on DDI by focusing its future democratization efforts on country-specific initiatives that help build up a broad democratic development programming expertise on the part of its field personnel. Wherever viable, it should work with indigenous organizations on activities they initiate and that can be carried out in-country.

e. AMIDEAST also should explore how to more strategically employ its international exchange and training programs, the activities regarding which AMIDEAST has the greatest expertise, to directly or indirectly serve democratic development ends.

f. To the extent that it can obtain donor support for work regarding democratization, a focus on civil society programming in the Near East seems warranted for AMIDEAST in the future. This recommendation springs from the democratic development assistance experience of other organizations and regions (as well as from interviews the team conducted over the course of its mission). For example, while recognizing the need for different strategies in different societies, a 1994 USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) report, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice recommended greater attention to a civil society-oriented strategy for USAID efforts to promote legal systems development in many countries.

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[1] As used in this report, "intermediary organization" refers to a U.S.-based entity such as AMIDEAST, which receives USAID funds to work with what this report refers to as "indigenous" bodies such as Near Eastern parliaments, judiciaries and NGOs.

More broadly, the goal of democratic development work with governmental bodies should not simply be to increase the technical proficiency of those entities, because doing so could well leave most citizens in a given society marginalized in terms of effective participation and services. Rather, the goal should be accountable, responsive institutions. To achieve that end, it is often necessary to undertake civil society programming with groups composed of or working on behalf of populations that have a concrete interest in seeing their government officials perform accountably.

This by no means precludes a balanced approach that also includes working with governmental bodies regarding, e.g., legislative or legal systems development. The point, instead, is that such work should at the very least occur in conjunction with efforts to bolster civil society.

g. As many within USAID and AMIDEAST already realize, a central aspect of an increased emphasis on civil society programming and on democratic development generally is the status of women. As previously noted, there is no guarantee that improved technical capacities will necessarily make government institutions any more responsive to the interests of marginalized groups such as women. It is hard to conceive of an adequately functioning democracy excluding half of the population from adequate participation, both in terms of formal democratic structures (e.g., parliament, the courts) and in terms of realizing its rights with respect to the issues that most affect it.

h. If AMIDEAST is committed to the field of Democracy/Governance and integrating it into all of its programs (not solely those funded by DDI) as much as possible, future personnel decisions should reflect this priority. That is, the recruitment and retention of field personnel (be they country directors or other professional staff) and other staff positions should attach significant weight to whether their experience provides them with useful skills for work regarding democratic development.

i. Separately or together, USAID and AMIDEAST should explore ways of bridging the gap between socioeconomic and democratic development programming. Some of the most successful democratic development work of donors and indigenous entities around the globe has built on more mainstream development activities such as community organizing, micro-enterprise lending, and strengthening of forest and water users' associations, for these help build social and economic independence that beneficiaries sometimes can translate into enhanced political power or assertion of their legal rights. What should be explored is how to better integrate DD-oriented activities into such mainstream work.

This certainly is not to suggest that AMIDEAST itself launch socioeconomic development initiatives. Rather, where USAID or other donors have done so, AMIDEAST might explore how it could build democratic development efforts on the foundations established by other development initiatives. An example of such work can be found in Yemen, where an NGO is combining family planning education with efforts to teach members of both sexes that women have the right to control their own bodies and fertility.

4. Potential Close-Out Activities

A modest level of funding remains in DDI for a final activity that would involve AMIDEAST personnel in a manner that could review lessons from the project, consider broader democratic development issues and build toward future work in this field. Three possible options (discussed in the main body of this report) are a seminar on the status of women and workshops on legal systems development and democratic development. In addition to AMIDEAST and perhaps USAID staff, these meetings would feature experts in these areas of development.

A fourth option would be for AMIDEAST and USAID to organize a meeting or even a retreat without outside participation, to exchange views on salient questions that cropped up repeatedly during the course of DDI and that have affected or in the future could affect the relationship between the two organizations. These questions, and the divergent points of view they reflect, include:

a. To what extent did AMIDEAST assume the role of a contractor/service provider in DDI, rather than acting as a grantee pursuing its own program initiatives with USAID support? And, to what extent should it have taken a consistent initiative? One point of view holds that AMIDEAST was insufficiently aggressive in setting its own agenda through DDI, that it acted as a contractor rather than as an independent partner. Another point of view maintains that such a course was inevitable for AMIDEAST, given the signals it received from USAID/Washington and the need to be responsive to USAID field missions in order to generate new projects.

b. To what extent should AMIDEAST have expected USAID missions to launch democracy programs that would make use of AMIDEAST and DDI, thereby sustaining the latter? One point of view is that this was implicit in the cooperative agreement and/or the negotiations leading up to it. Another is that AMIDEAST was supposed to use DDI to leverage funds that could possibly but not definitely include mission support.

c. How much potential is there for AMIDEAST to generate non-USAID funds for democratic development work? One point of view is that AMIDEAST has been insufficiently aggressive in seeking out other donors; that it should look to such sources as Arab Americans for support and to organizations such as PACT and CARE to learn about how they creatively stretch their resources and/or raise funds; and that some of the resources it puts into proposals and other aspects of new business development might be better invested in modest pilot activities that over time would build up AMIDEAST's democratic development experience and track record, and thereby enhance its ability to solicit donor support. Another view asserts that AMIDEAST is very constrained in terms of its ability to stretch its resources, and that it has explored funding alternatives to USAID to no avail.

d. How much flexibility can USAID provide a grantee like AMIDEAST? One view maintains that it is unrealistic and even naive to think that USAID can give an intermediary organization a relatively free hand regarding the sensitive political judgments involved with democratic development programming. Another argues that some USAID missions have done so already without suffering any political harm, and that in any event such flexibility is crucial to successful democratic development work. Yet a third perspective is that intermediary flexibility is likely to vary from country to country, hinging on political sensitivities and the role of the USG in the country.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF DDI'S STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES

This section represents a summary of background, services, strategy, constraints, activities and developments pertaining to DDI, rather than an evaluation of how well AMIDEAST performed with respect to these. (Sections III and IV, in contrast, constitute an evaluation of the project's success regarding its main objectives of institution-building and financial sustainability.)

A. Background

Founded in 1951, AMIDEAST is a nongovernmental organization that promotes understanding and cooperation between Americans and the people of the Near East [2] through educational advising, training, technical assistance, public outreach and development programs. AMIDEAST has consultative status, Category II, with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It maintains a staff of over 190 employees in both Washington and the field. The FY 1994 budget was about $35 million, with about $26 million derived from USAID funding. (This is a continuation of previous trends, which have seen AMIDEAST receive millions of dollars in contracts, cooperative agreements and grants from USAID.)

In accordance with DDI's project design, AMIDEAST located its DDI technical unit at the organization's Washington headquarters. The unit coordinates its work with USAID/Washington and with the six AMIDEAST country offices selected for the project under the cooperative agreement: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon. DDI was designed to support the full-time work of the three-person DDI unit, and to support 10 percent of the six AMIDEAST country directors' time. This concentrated much of the technical capacity at AMIDEAST/Washington, on account of the degree of coordination and backstopping activity that was anticipated. This also reflected the possibility that, in the course of the three-year DDI time frame, USAID missions might generate new democracy and governance activities that largely would sustain AMIDEAST staff and institutional capacity both in the field and in Washington after the DDI project came to an end.

On the implementation side, the DDI technical unit and the AMIDEAST field offices have focused on local partner institutions in the legislative, judicial and NGO sectors in the six countries. (Though work with media also originally was anticipated, on the advice of USAID/Washington this faded as a priority.)

While AMIDEAST had already amassed some experience in these three areas through previous activities, DDI further developed this focus. Through the periodic field visits of the two successive DDI directors, ongoing consultation with the AMIDEAST country directors and DDI sector assessments, specific needs of democratic institutions in all three sectors have been

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[2] While this report employs the term "Near East," we should note that the AMIDEAST Mission Statement refers to the region and the Middle East and North Africa.

identified, and the confidence of current and potential local partners has been built gradually and steadily, as it must be in delicate programming environments.

B. Nature of Activities

Over the course of DDI, AMIDEAST has carried out various D/G activities in the six target countries. These have included conducting needs assessments, training for staff of selected democratic institutions, arranging and facilitating conferences, and providing short-term technical assistance. We should emphasize, however, that not all of these services have actually employed DDI funds. Some, in fact, have drawn on the DDI program budget. Others have drawn on the DDI administrative budget to utilize DDI staff time. Still other activities grew in part out of activities which DDI staff helped formulate or to which they otherwise contributed, but regarding which their time was funded entirely out of other sources.

AMIDEAST, including its DDI unit, also has played an intermediary role in relating to indigenous partners in cases where USG offices cannot do so directly. This has included instances where considerations pertaining to political sensitivity, legal constraints or other factors prevent a local NGO from accepting support from a foreign government source or where local beneficiaries cannot meet USAID financial reporting requirements and an intermediary organization is needed to administer funds.

C. DDI's Approach

Where possible, DDI has sought to integrate activities so that strengthening an institution in one of its three target areas (of legislative, judicial and NGO development) would complement work in another area. One example of this approach has been in working with civil society institutions (NGOs) throughout the region, including educational, vocational, community development and human rights groups. On occasion, such work may have contributed to developments regarding legislatures. For example, after the DDI unit fielded a consultant to Morocco to conduct NGO training in organizational development and coalition building, women's NGOs collectively gathered signatures in support of a petition to reform the *muduanna* (personal status law). This popular action was instrumental in the development of a draft law that parliament adopted in 1993, granting women more rights. Given the constraints on its time and research, however, the team was not able to verify whether the AMIDEAST consultant's input contributed to this accomplishment.

AMIDEAST recognizes that many of the factors affecting democratization progress in the region are largely beyond its control. These include the overall political environments of the countries in the region, as well as institutional and policy changes within USAID and its missions. Within such constraints, DDI has sought to optimize limited resources for the most constructive effect.

A common criticism of parliaments in the region, for example, is that they lack the demonstrated fiscal responsibility and administrative sophistication to manage funds and, therefore, are not yet mature enough to review and oversee national budgets. This Catch 22-type situation can be overcome by providing the financial management tools that first increase the efficiency of

internal legislative administration, and accordingly build institutional capacity to eventually assume larger fiscal responsibilities and budget oversight functions.

In the course of DDI implementation, AMIDEAST accordingly has operated on the assumption and with the long-term strategic view that supplying tools and expertise to representative institutions enhances the prospects of eventual power-sharing and the checks-and-balances mechanism in government systems. In Yemen, for example, parliament has expressed its intent to assert its independence from the executive branch. In other countries in the region, similar sentiments prevail, however more subtly expressed.

D. The DDI Unit

The following sections reflect the activities and developments that have occurred since project start-up in July 1991, especially those that pertain to the DDI purpose of expanding AMIDEAST's institutional capacity to promote democratic development.

1. Institutional Development Under DDI

Under DDI, AMIDEAST has sought to build its institutional resources through personnel training and development activities, research and information collection and management, and developing a consultant database. While specific training opportunities in democratic development are rare, the Washington-based DDI Unit staff (who, for the sake of clarity, should be distinguished from field staff) have taken part in numerous conferences, colloquia and workshops on democracy and development in the Near East; gender analysis in development; social, economic and political developments in the region; proposal writing and computer skills.

Experience in democratic development in general, and DDI in particular, indicates that the nature of work is largely a learn-by-doing proposition. It seems that substantive information-gathering pertaining to such learning is constrained by the disproportionate amount of time needed to carry out bureaucratic tasks. In the course of this evaluation, DDI staff accordingly have expressed interest in further training opportunities, particularly in management techniques.

Many of DDI's activities have contributed to strengthening two types of institutional capacity: research and information collection and management, and developing a consultant database. DDI staff participation in relevant conferences has led to collecting needed information and maintaining contacts with other experts in academia, government and nongovernmental institutions. DDI has gathered specialized information through various sources, including periodical subscriptions, documents and research reports.

2. Staffing

Initially the DDI project was staffed in 1991 with Director Susan Ziadeh and Project Assistant Jennifer Baker. In 1992, Nagla El-Bassioni joined the project as project specialist and Arah Erickson replaced the previous project assistant.

Joseph Schechla replaced the outgoing Susan Ziadeh in late October 1993 as DDI director. In 1994, Ms. El-Bassioni was promoted to project coordinator and Ms. Erickson was promoted to project specialist.

In the fall of 1994, the DDI unit recruited an intern to provide interim administrative support. At the time of this evaluation, the DDI unit is consolidating with two additional AMIDEAST staff, Lydia Grebe and Cara Feys, who work principally to support the USAID-supported Institutional Development Project (IDP) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That project also focuses on strengthening governance and democratic institutions, and AMIDEAST is consolidating its related headquarters expertise in the form of a Democratic Development Division under the direction and supervision of Joseph Schechla, the DDI director. This larger, consolidated division at AMIDEAST represents a deepening and expansion of staff capacity to design and implement institutional development projects in governance and democracy.

3. Regional Coordination

The DDI staff at AMIDEAST/Washington facilitate AMIDEAST's coordination of activities across political boundaries. This has occasionally lent itself to activities complementing and reinforcing each other across sectors and borders. One example of this is DDI's support for a regional Women's NGO Workshop in Jordan, which addressed common concerns of women's rights organizations across the region. In the legislative sector, AMIDEAST's investigation of information management needs has resulted in the DDI unit seeking to work with Tunisian, Yemeni and Moroccan parliaments to develop ways to improve their institutional capacities to process data to meet both their administrative and legislative needs.

E. Specific Activities

The following narrative presents selected activities of AMIDEAST in democracy and governance throughout the course of the DDI project. These reflect efforts of the DDI unit at AMIDEAST/Washington, as well as AMIDEAST colleagues in the field. In countries where efforts funded directly under DDI took place, they are described under the heading of **DDI-Funded Activities**. Those that drew upon and/or built AMIDEAST's capacity to carry out governance and democracy project activities, but that did not employ DDI funds are described under the heading of **Non-DDI Activities**.

Some DDI funds were consumed by AMIDEAST country directors' consultations with the successive DDI unit directors during their periodic visits. The unit and country directors also met with governmental and nongovernmental leaders during these visits. (As already noted, 10 percent of the country directors' time was devoted to DDI, in the form of such meetings and work related to DDI program activities.)

In addition, the aforementioned regional workshop regarding women and political participation in Jordan had participants from most of the areas covered in this section. The workshop is described in further detail below.

Finally, we should note that many of the activities identified below were not launched in a programming vacuum. Some built on AMIDEAST's experience with the aforementioned USAID-funded Legal Education and Training Project (LET) in the region.

1.Egypt

Non-DDI Activities

a. USAID/Egypt directly funds AMIDEAST/Cairo's Legal Rights Project (LRP), which is slated to operate from March 1993 through March 1997. The DDI staff at AMIDEAST HQ provide financial monitoring and other program backstopping support to the LRP. Since March 1992, LRP has provided legal English training to judges and prosecutors at the National Center for Judicial Studies, and a legal rights English curriculum for lawyers and human rights specialists at AMIDEAST's offices in Cairo. LRP also involves AMIDEAST cosponsoring training conferences and workshops with Egyptian NGOs throughout the country on a variety of human rights topics. Outstanding participants in the legal English program will be placed in advanced-degree programs in the United States. All of these activities involve some degree of collaboration between AMIDEAST/Cairo's Legal Training Unit (LTU) and the DDI staff.

b. At the request of USAID/Egypt, AMIDEAST administered a February-March 1994 institutional needs assessment of Egypt's National Center for Judicial Studies (NCJS), that country's official institution for the training of judges, prosecutors and court administration staff. AMIDEAST/Cairo and the DDI staff recruited a U.S. judicial education consultant and a local counterpart to assess the strengths and weaknesses of NCJS and its training curriculum. The purpose was to assist USAID in determining how best to assist the Ministry of Justice in strengthening NCJS's capabilities and, thus, to improve the legal knowledge base and judicial skills of the Egyptian judiciary.

2. Jordan

DDI-Funded activities

a. The AMIDEAST country director worked with the DDI director and staff to develop the scope of work for a technical needs assessment of the Jordanian parliament in 1992. The DDI staff recruited and fielded a legislative development expert for the assessment, which was completed in October 1992.

Non-DDI Activities

a. Since the aforementioned parliamentary assessment, much of the AMIDEAST/Jordan and DDI experience in Jordan has been characterized by developing and promoting potential institutional development and training interventions for the judicial and NGO sectors. This included DDI and AMIDEAST/Jordan developing unsuccessful unsolicited proposals to USAID for institutional strengthening and training activities with NGOs promoting women's legal rights in 1992 and the Jordanian Judicial Institute in 1994.

3. Lebanon

DDI-Funded Activities

a. Operating from November 1991 through February 1992, a three-person team assembled by the DDI unit undertook an institutional development assessment for USAID/Lebanon. The team identified constraints to and strategies for enhancing democratic development in Lebanon. The study focused on the key areas of the rule of law, public administration, democratic representation and free flow of information. The document, "Postwar Institutional Development in Lebanon: An

Assessment for Foreign Assistance," provided a basis for subsequent USAID and World Bank activities in the country.

b. The AMIDEAST/Beirut office has designed and proposed a Lebanon Legal English project activity to be carried out utilizing the balance of DDI program funds originally earmarked for Lebanon. Tailored to meet local needs, this activity has adapted the curriculum that AMIDEAST/Cairo developed under the LRP Project. USAID approval of the Legal English proposal came at the end of December 1994 (as part of the DDI extension request).

An AMIDEAST/Beirut staff member subsequently traveled to Cairo in February 1995 to consult with LRP/AMIDEAST staff on curriculum design, administrative and participant selection issues. At the time of this evaluation, AMIDEAST/Beirut has collected curriculum materials with the help of AMIDEAST/Cairo and the HQ DDI staff, and participant recruitment and selection has begun. AMIDEAST Legal English training will be offered through the second half of 1995, concluding by the end of the calendar year and the close of DPI.

Non-DDI Activities

a. AMIDEAST/Beirut is a subcontractor on the Government Institutions Strengthening Component of the Lebanon Relief and Redevelopment Project, albeit only providing administrative support.

4. Morocco

DDI-Funded Activities

a. In May 1993, DDI staff and AMIDEAST/Morocco organized a day-long workshop regarding the promotion and advancement of women's rights in Morocco, and recruited the international program director from the U.S. National Organization for Women to visit the country in connection with the gathering. Both during the workshop and through other activities, she consulted with Moroccan NGOs on organizational development, program and strategy development, advocacy and media outreach. Approximately seventy representatives from various Moroccan NGOs attended the workshop, with a men/women ratio of approximately 60/40. The discussions highlighted the importance of coalition building, improving organizational visibility, fund raising, volunteerism and general issues of office management, particularly personnel issues. The first topic was particularly salient, since a principal obstacle to NGO development in Morocco is the local tendency not to work in coalitions. It was notable, then, that in such a fractured interorganizational environment the event drew participants from most major NGOs. These workshop and related activities constituted a step in the development of AMIDEAST's working relationship with women's organizations active in Morocco.

5. Tunisia

DDI-Funded Activities

a. AMIDEAST cosponsored and provided technical support to two Rule of Law conferences involving legal experts from throughout the region.

b. DDI programmed training for Tunisian Chamber of Deputies staff in the techniques of legislative information management as part of AMIDEAST's DDI program objective of enhancing the effective function of Tunisia's parliament.

c. AMIDEAST support made it possible for L'Association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Developpement (AFTURD), a women's NGO, to produce three brochures to inform women of their legal and political rights in specific areas of Tunisian law. Produced in Arabic and French, they are entitled, "The Woman and Marriage," "The Woman and Divorce" and "The Woman and the Workplace." The series describes how the legislative and judicial systems function, and highlights the opportunities available within those institutions for the enhancement of equality, elimination of discrimination and the increase of women's participation in development.

d. In January 1994, DDI funding and coordination made possible a two-week study/observation program to the United States for three members and two staffers of the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies.

6. Yemen

Non-DDI Activities

a. Under a cooperative agreement between USAID/Yemen and AMIDEAST that is separate from the DDI cooperative agreement, AMIDEAST has undertaken a range of activities described in this and succeeding paragraphs. The first was a democratic institutions sector survey and assessment, from February to May 1992. This sector assessment sought to determine the strengths and weaknesses of Yemen's national legal and legislative institutions. The findings were to be used in the design and implementation of activities that strengthen those institutions.

b. In October 1992, AMIDEAST organized an observation/study tour in the United States for five senior Yemeni justices and legal officials. The activity was designed to strengthen the Yemeni judicial system by exposing key figures to new and efficient approaches to a number of legal areas, particularly the idea of an independent judiciary.

c. In February 1993, AMIDEAST organized a needs assessment for the Yemen Parliament Library. The purpose of this activity was to assess the current condition and needs of the Yemeni parliament library. This activity is part of AMIDEAST's longer-term effort to support the institutional development of the Yemeni parliament as a force in continued democratization. The assessment will help guide USAID/Yemen in determining project activities in support of the parliament.

d. The most substantial assistance, starting in March 1993 and continuing to date, has been technical assistance to Yemen's Parliament. This is intended to strengthen the parliament of Yemen through institutional strengthening interventions and training so that the Parliament can continue its role in the democratization process. One of the interim activities envisioned under the AMIDEAST-USAID/Yemen Cooperative Agreement is a program to support the Yemeni Parliament develop its administrative facilities. AMIDEAST/Yemen hired a local technical assistant in September 1993 to help develop the core structure of administrative services at the Parliament. The assistant assessed the available office and instructional space at the old parliament building, and developed training programs for the parliamentary staff members who are

using computers that were purchased and delivered through the AMIDEAST/Yemen office for this activity.

7. West Bank/Gaza Strip

Non-DDI Activity

a. In addition to DDI activities in the original six countries, DDI responded to a call by USAID in late 1993 to design and develop concept papers for development work to support the governance and democracy process in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This led to a project proposal for the Public Law Project, which AMIDEAST is currently implementing.

The resulting USAID-supported West Bank and Gaza Strip Public Law Project was launched in 1994 for a period of approximately one year. The project's multiple objectives include organizing technical workshops, providing public fora for consensus building, limited material assistance, supporting applied research, facilitating the establishment of locally determined development priorities and gathering comprehensive information from key actors within the sector about development plans, priorities and programs. This information, now consolidated by AMIDEAST, is designed to help donors, NGOs, local institutions and practitioners in formulating a macro view of development inputs and to serve as a tool for coordination throughout related sectors.

b. The USAID-supported West Bank/Gaza Institutional Development Project (IDP), with a planned duration of October 1994 to September 1997, complements the Public Law Project. IDP's objective is to provide technical assistance in public administration and management to emerging institutions and agencies of the Palestinian Authority. The focus is on efficiency, fiscal management and general management.

8. Regional

DDI-Funded Activities

a. The Regional Workshop for NGOs promoting women's participation in governance, which took place in April 1994 in Jordan, aimed to develop a regional strategy for strengthening the institutional capacity of NGOs that promote women's legal and political rights and women's participation in governance, and to develop and strengthen linkages among these NGOs. The DDI unit collaborated with AMIDEAST country directors to design and implement this region-wide workshop for NGOs. DDI also designed and proposed a follow-on activity which USAID declined to support. DDI currently is refining the design with a view to obtaining support from both USAID and non-USAID sources.

III. THE IMPACT OF DDI ON AMIDEAST'S CAPACITY TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS

A. Objective and Terminology

The objective of AMIDEAST developing a capacity to effectively design and implement democracy programs throughout the Near East is contained in the DDI project purpose statement, which states, "The specific purpose of this agreement is to expand AMIDEAST's organizational capacity to undertake the design and implementation of political and legal programs..." For USAID staff directly involved with this effort, DDI was, simply stated, an institutional development program with AMIDEAST in the field of democracy promotion. We should note, however, that DDI also was intended to engage USAID missions in developing democracy programs in conjunction with, or parallel to, DDI's "catalyzing' use of program funds. DDI effectiveness (and sustainability), accordingly, relied to a great extent on developments within USAID.

The central question for this element of the evaluation remains: How effective was AMIDEAST in strengthening its organizational capacity to design and implement democracy programs?

Before beginning this analysis, it is important to clarify some of the terminology. First, while there is a slight distinction between "institutional development" and "organizational capacity," with the former referring more to a process and the latter more of an outcome, for the purposes of this evaluation the terms will be used interchangeably. This is in keeping with the evaluation that is assessing how well AMIDEAST effectively carried out an institutional development program in democracy promotion and, as a result, strengthened its organizational capacity in democracy promotion.

Another matter regarding terminology needs to be clarified. The DDI agreement states that AMIDEAST will develop an organizational capacity in "political and legal programs." While these terms may have been appropriate in 1991 when the DDI agreement was initiated, USAID's expertise in democracy has advanced a great deal since that time and the terminology is much better refined. Today, the phrase "political and legal programs" would be viewed as a narrow aspect of the democracy sector and this would not be in keeping with the intent of DDI. The purpose of DDI was to develop within AMIDEAST the capacity to carry out a broad range of democracy-oriented programs, including but not limited to judiciaries, human rights, civil society and parliaments. As a result, the term "democracy-promotion" is more appropriate for the DDI project at this point and will be used in this section of the report.

B. Organizational Strength of AMIDEAST

To begin assessing the institutional strengthening of AMIDEAST it is to important to establish a basis of analysis. How strong an organization is AMIDEAST? And how much could the organization realistically be expected to achieve during the life of the DDI cooperative agreement? The AMIDEAST proposal, which is an integral part of the DDI agreement with USAID, states:

By the end of the three years of the grant, AMIDEAST will have developed and carried out project activities which strengthen key democratic institutions in up to eight countries in the Near East. Moreover, AMIDEAST will have strengthened its own institutional capability to design and implement programs, established a U.S. and in-region network of resources and experts it can draw on for project support, developed a strategy for self-sustainability beyond the three year term of the

grant, and become recognized as the leading American organization working to promote and strengthen democratic institutions in the Near East.

While AMIDEAST's language is perhaps a bit overstated for an institutional development activity taking place over a relatively short period, the agreement language makes it clear that AMIDEAST fully expected to develop an expertise in democracy promotion and that this expertise would be institutionalized within the organization. This is not to suggest that DDI aimed to integrate D/G concepts throughout all AMIDEAST programs, but rather that a variety of field and staff members would become better able to undertake democratic development work.

But how strong is AMIDEAST as a development organization working in the Near East? Based on the team's limited field exposure and follow-up interviews with USAID field personnel, AMIDEAST appears to utilize its expertise and network of field offices in the region to maintain good relations with a wide variety of in-country organizations, institutions, individuals and host governments. Over the years, AMIDEAST has, for the most part, also maintained good working relationships with USAID missions as well, through either specific USAID funding agreements or simply as part of the broader expatriate development community.

In addition, AMIDEAST country directors have had some prior experience in the broad democracy and human rights field. Starting in the early 1980s and over the course of nearly a decade, AMIDEAST gained valuable experience through the regional USAID/Washington-funded Legal English and Training (LET) Program. This effort resulted in AMIDEAST working with judicial and legislative branches, human rights organizations and advocacy NGOs. The LET experience represented a base upon which the AMIDEAST country directors could build expertise in democracy programming, particularly regarding the types of activities with which AMIDEAST has the most experience, such as training and exchange programs.

AMIDEAST, accordingly, has a strong base of organizational capacity for the development and integration of expertise in democracy promotion. AMIDEAST's DDI proposal articulates this point by stating:

As a private non-profit, non-political organization with 40 years of programming experience in the Near East, AMIDEAST is well placed to develop and carry out a program to identify and respond to democratic institutional development needs...[AMIDEAST] will be building on a strong network of offices across the region, an array of professional relationships and contacts, demonstrated expertise in linking Near Eastern institutional develop needs with appropriate forms of assistance, and the trust and respect of Arabs and Americans who have worked with or benefited from the organization during its 40 years of service.

AMIDEAST accordingly was an appropriate selection for the DDI effort because of its network of field offices and its resulting combination of knowledge, experience and contacts in the region.

C. Problems Affecting DDI

As discussed below, AMIDEAST brought on appropriate personnel and achieved modest success in implementing DDI within the constraints imposed by the project's structure. Nevertheless, the project was plagued by several difficulties, springing in part from that structure.

The most salient feature is that DDI is heavily Washington-centered, in that most of the DDI funds support a core unit based in Washington. As a result, DDI funds that could have been better spent directly developing field office capacity, and carrying out local democracy initiatives, were consumed by more indirect efforts. In addition, non-DDI funds that could have supported country-specific programs and in the process developed AMIDEAST field office capacities regarding democratic development were not forthcoming from most USAID missions or other sources.

Another factor that hampered DDI boils down to the fact that, to put the matter colloquially, "too many cooks spoil the broth." A wide array of USG personnel have been involved with both major and minor DDI-related decisions, which at times resulted in conflicting guidance and instructions for AMIDEAST along the way. These personnel have included several Washington-based USAID project officers, as well as ambassadors, embassy political officers, other members of USG democracy working groups in certain countries, and members of USAID missions. It is important to emphasize that each sought to provide useful advice and guidance to advance democratic development. But the net result was DDI being stymied or pulled in various directions. (We should note, nevertheless, that AMIDEAST field offices' relationships with most USAID missions have been positive.)

These problems have taken varied forms. In Tunisia, for example, U.S. Embassy involvement complicated the joint efforts of USAID and AMIDEAST. There appear to have been conflicting signals from various USAID personnel about whether programming with women's NGOs was a priority. USAID/Yemen's ability to move ahead with an expanded democracy program, which could well involve AMIDEAST, has run into roadblocks in USAID/Washington. And AMIDEAST experienced considerable frustration over repeated stops and starts on the parts of USAID missions in at least two other countries.

DDI progress also has been hampered by other exogenous factors, such as a civil war in Yemen and the fact that the Jordan-Israel peace process, for all of its potential benefits, contributed to a much more sensitive programming environment in Jordan. In the latter case, development priorities other than a direct, explicit focus on democratization have emerged in response to U.S. and Jordanian interests in ensuring tangible benefits from the peace process and normalization with Israel.

Other obstacles relate to the degree to which partner organizations, be they USAID or national institutions, have developed clear democracy objectives. In certain instances, this has been because USAID missions have attached higher priorities to other development objectives -- decisions which the team is not questioning -- or because they have not prepared democracy strategies or because USAID/Washington has not approved such strategies. In some missions, this delay in developing clear democratic development objectives and strategies is in part due to the relative newness of democratization issues for USAID or the turnover of mission personnel, and/or the reluctance of some USAID personnel to pursue often controversial, political development activities.

With regard to national institutions, a lack of clear objectives stems from the relative inexperience of some government institutions (e.g., parliaments) regarding planning their institutional-development priorities. Thus, a chicken-and-egg situation affects partners in some countries. In the course of the DDI project, AMIDEAST has found that, in working with USAID and local institutional counterparts, extra time has been required to draw out development visions, strategic decisions and priorities before actually implementing activities.

One example of this is NGOs. Most of the region's NGOs are small and weak, often operating without an office. While some are strong on leadership and force of personality, those same organizations may be lacking in strategic planning. In AMIDEAST's experience, it has been often difficult to get a prospective partner organization to present a proposal or work plan. Thus, many needy NGOs lack the skills and absorptive capacity to benefit from DDI institutional-strengthening assistance.

Another factor, albeit less concrete, that may have hampered DDI was the impression harbored by some USAID personnel that DDI aimed to make AMIDEAST into the Near Eastern equivalent of The Asia Foundation (TAF), which undertakes democratic development work in Asia. For the most part, it is not appropriate to compare the two organizations, in that TAF receives an annual appropriation from Congress that it has considerable leeway to utilize. In addition, unlike AMIDEAST, TAF focuses mainly on democratic development and related concerns, so it has a broader and longer-standing range of experience regarding relevant issues, actors and strategies. Finally, TAF operates in nations which, for the most part, offer more open programming environments.

D. AMIDEAST's DDI Unit Staffing

The central methodology employed for developing an expertise in democracy promotion within AMIDEAST was the creation of a technical democracy unit. This unit, called the DDI Unit, is based in the AMIDEAST headquarters in Washington, D.C. and is made up of three staff members, their titles being Program Director, Program Officer and Administrative Assistant. It is important to note that the DDI Unit was funded entirely by USAID. Funding for the DDI Unit coupled with AMIDEAST's administrative costs represent over 75 percent of the total DDI budget of $1.6 million. As such, the DDI Unit is clearly the "heart and soul" of the DDI project.

How well was the DDI Unit staffed? As with most small units, and particularly one that represents a new effort such as DDI, much of the success often depends on the qualifications and abilities of the unit director. In this case, there have been two DDI Program Directors. The first was with AMIDEAST for the first two and one-half years of the DDI project. The present DDI Program Director has been with AMIDEAST for about a year and one-half. Based on interviews regarding the performance of both of these individuals and the direct involvement with the present Program Director over the course of this evaluation, the two non-AMIDEAST members of this evaluation team conclude that qualifications and abilities of the DDI Program Directors have been more than adequate.

In particular, the present Program Director's knowledge of the region appears to be solid. In an area of the world that has long been gripped and polarized by conflict, where there are few democratic governments and where democracy promotion activities must be crafted to local terms and sensitivities, a solid understanding of the regional economic and political dynamics is essential for a successful regional democracy effort.

Based on a wide range of interviews, it was less clear to the two non-AMIDEAST members of the evaluation team that the impressive breadth and depth of the Program Director's knowledge of the region and of democratic development generally was imparted to the AMIDEAST country directors in a manner that would translate into effective democratic development programming.

E. DDI Unit Program Initiatives

With the DDI Unit effectively staffed, two important questions arise. First, what steps did AMIDEAST take to institutionalize its capacity in democracy promotion? And how effective were such steps? Clearly, the best way for AMIDEAST to begin building and demonstrating expertise in democracy promotion, and even institutionalizing this effort within the organization, was via direct, hands-on experience. The notion of how AMIDEAST would go about building democracy programs in the Near East was clearly articulated by USAID in the DDI cooperative agreement:

Within three years AMIDEAST hopes to establish largely self-financed in-country [democracy] programs using funds which might be provided by A.I.D.

AMIDEAST's own proposal (which, as noted above, was integrated into the cooperative agreement as an attachment) contains the following statement:

In large part, AMIDEAST anticipates that by the end of the three year term of the core grant, most, if not all, Near East USAID missions will have funds to allocate for democracy-building activities.

The two statements contained in the DDI cooperative agreement, one on the part of USAID and one by AMIDEAST, reveal a slight distinction between the two parties' interpretation of whether and to what extent USAID missions would initiate democracy programs during the operational life of DDI. Nevertheless, both make it clear that AMIDEAST and USAID were anticipating that the missions would become active in the democracy field and bilateral democracy funding would be made available. These funds would be outside and additional to the DDI project. And while these funds would not be specifically set aside for AMIDEAST, it was envisaged that AMIDEAST would be involved, to some degree, with these democracy efforts. With the DDI project providing only an originally anticipated $507,000 out of the $1.6 million total for field-based democracy program activities, or what is referred to in the cooperative agreement as "seed" activities, mission bilateral funds represented a golden opportunity for operationalizing AMIDEAST's expanding expertise in democracy promotion.

However, for this to happen there needed to be a well coordinated Bureau-wide democracy program. Under normal operating procedures for traditional USAID geographic bureaus, which stress a highly decentralized approach with ample decision-making and authority resting in the field, this would have required an extraordinary amount of coordination between USAID/Washington and the USAID field missions. There certainly was, in many respects, good democracy leadership being demonstrated in USAID/Washington on the field of democracy promotion and good communication with the missions. However, this arrangement, as good as it was, did not represent a tightly structured democracy program with mutually agreed upon program objectives and programming modalities between the Bureau and the missions that would have resulted in AMIDEAST receiving mission bilateral democracy funding.

While the evaluation has revealed some differing interpretations and recollections on the parts of USAID and AMIDEAST regarding the history of specific USAID guidance and AMIDEAST tactics for engaging USAID missions in the democracy field, AMIDEAST, nevertheless, has carried out an array of program activities, reports, needs assessments and studies. Based on the

various initiatives undertaken, AMIDEAST charted a reasonable course for engaging USAID missions in the democracy sector. In particular, the sector assessments, such as in the legal/judicial and legislative areas, appear responsive to mission interest, advice from USAID/Washington and potential programming possibilities. Also, the selection of expert consultants by AMIDEAST was timely and appropriate. The various sector and activity reports developed by AMIDEAST reflect both the objective of the DDI project and the course chosen to initiate democracy programs with USAID missions.

F. Field Staff and Operations

The Washington-based DDI Unit was clearly designed to provide the intellectual and strategic leadership for DDI. However, any such effort would be dependent upon a close and effective working relationship with the AMIDEAST country offices. As examined in this evaluation, the DDI Unit and the country AMIDEAST country offices were in regular communication regarding both country and regional activities. While the extent and depth of this interaction was dependent upon the nature and complexity of the activity undertaken, the Washington-to-field interaction was more than adequate for designing and implementing democratization activities.

In addition to the DDI project providing full funding for the DDI Unit, 10 percent of AMIDEAST country directors' time was funded by DDI. Given the nature of the overall project, which was heavily Washington-based, this funding structure at least provided some support for field staff involvement in democratic development. To a limited extent, it suited the objective of strengthening the organizational capacity of AMIDEAST to carry out democracy programs in an area of the world perhaps most sensitive to donor-inspired -- and particularly U.S.- or Western-inspired -- democratization initiatives. With USAID providing 100 percent support for the DDI Unit, covering some of the costs of the AMIDEAST country directors' time for the implementation of democracy activities was not only appropriate but should have added an important local incentive for building democratization expertise.

How well qualified are the AMIDEAST country directors to design and implement democracy activities, and how well did they perform? The country directors seem to have strong contact with local NGOs, individuals, host government institutions and universities. Furthermore, they also appear to be aware of the political and cultural constraints that affect democratic development programming in their respective nations. While it cannot be said that the country directors are overall "democracy experts," their knowledge in the democracy field is more than satisfactory for carrying out the specific democratization activities with which they have been associated.

Nevertheless, the capacity of the country directors to initiate work regarding diverse aspects of democratization -- for example, for a director experienced in parliamentary development to launch a new activity addressing the status of women -- may vary from country to country. And while, as noted above, they are in touch with the politics and cultures of the countries in which they work, the team is not in a position to conclude that the experience and orientation they have accumulated with AMIDEAST (outside of DDI) fully equip them for the wide range of tasks (ranging from strategy development to project evaluation) required for democratic development programming.

Also unclear is the extent to which ongoing contact with AMIDEAST's Washington-based DDI Unit has significantly enhanced the field staff's capabilities. This is not to say that they have not benefited from the existence of the unit, in that it has facilitated certain DDI activities as well

as other programs which were indirect outgrowths of DDI. But the extent to which DDI formally and informally focused on enhancing field staff expertise -- by arranging or facilitating field staff training, discussions between field offices on issues and programs, exposure to research regarding democratization, and awareness of approaches and strategies of other donors -- appears to have been limited.

Of even more fundamental importance, and as will be argued in Section V of his report, the main mechanism for learning about democratic development is through actually doing it -- that is, through funding, coordinating, monitoring, administering, conducting and evaluating such work. The design and organizational structure of the DDI effort significantly limited these kinds of opportunities. In addition, a variety of factors, including but not limited to differences of opinion between AMIDEAST and USAID regarding activities that merited support, resulted in AMIDEAST spending significantly less of the important DDI program funds (an anticipated $313,437) than were originally available ($507,000). [3] This "seed money" could have helped bolster field expertise and impact.

Furthermore, it is very difficult for even the best qualified individuals to develop and promote a vision for an organization if they are otherwise engaged with more immediate tasks. This would seem to be the case with DDI, in that the two individuals who have headed its efforts often have been tied down with day-to-day matters flowing from the ever-shifting variety of actors and factors affecting their work. This has left relatively little time for development of a long-range vision that they otherwise could construct for AMIDEAST's democratic development efforts.

Another issue that is critical for AMIDEAST to examine is whether it is committed to furthering its work in democracy/governance. If AMIDEAST's senior managers, field staff and board of directors place a high value on promoting democratic governance in the Middle East, they will undoubtedly find ways to obtain and channel resources in that direction.

G. The AMIDEAST Yemen, Jordan and West Bank/Gaza Programs

Because the team specifically visited Yemen and Jordan and was able to meet with an AMIDEAST staff member involved with the organizations' West Bank/Gaza program, these three areas merit special attention in this report.

AMIDEAST's performance in Yemen stands out as an example of apparently appropriate programming relating to the country's legislature. The USAID Mission Director strongly praised both AMIDEAST's program to assist the newly emerging Parliament and the AMIDEAST country director's work. A journalist and a political scientist also implicitly endorsed the track being taken by the program. AMIDEAST was able to secure a bilateral grant from USAID/Yemen to assist the Parliament with automation equipment, computer training and U.S. study tours.

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[3] We should note that some of this excess was due to the fact that not all of the funds originally earmarked for two countries, Lebanon and Tunisia, have been spent. In any event, the total excess funds reverted to the DDI administrative budget, and accordingly helped finance the extension of the DDI agreement.

Several aspects of AMIDEAST's parliamentary program in Yemen are noteworthy. First, AMIDEAST identified parliament as an institution that could play an important role in the overall democratization of Yemen. While clearly nascent and fledgling, parliament could become a pivotal player in the years ahead and may, therefore, merit a modest investment of development funds. Second, the AMIDEAST country director's day-to-day working relationship with the parliamentary staff's leadership is impressive. Third, the country director maintains strong contacts with a wide variety of relevant organizations, individuals and host government representatives. This can indirectly inform his decisions regarding the pace and focus of working with parliament in the future.

Nonetheless, there is concern among some at USAID that a computerized parliament will not necessarily result in a democratic parliament, and perhaps AMIDEAST could have found a more effective, more financially sustainable, and less costly type of programming. As a consulting team visiting the country for a very short period of time, we defer to the good arguments offered by the AMIDEAST country director, the USAID mission director, an independent journalist and a political scientist/human rights activist in support of this approach to working with the legislature.

Jordan offers a much more sensitive environment for democracy programming, partly because normalization with Israel has affected many aspects of the country's democratization. Despite the limitations, AMIDEAST was successful in carrying out a number of discrete activities. Needs assessments were implemented regarding Parliament and the Judicial Institute, and a regional workshop on women's political participation was held.

However, even with these activities, AMIDEAST's links with the mission regarding democratization were somewhat limited. One major constraint, in the view of USAID/Washington, was the mission's decision not to undertake a democracy assessment, thereby limiting its ability to move in any particular strategic direction. That decision was made within the framework of the country USG Democracy Committee, because the assessment was viewed as "politically sensitive and counterproductive." Still, that the mission has undertaken other democracy-oriented work, though not explicitly under the rubric of a democracy strategy. Its Women in Development program, for example, has aimed to enhance women's electoral participation.

It seems that neither the mission nor AMIDEAST had a clear picture of how the two organizations were to work together under the confines of the DDI project. Perhaps if the structure of this working relationship had been better defined by USAID/Washington at the early stages of the DDI project, the communication between the mission and AMIDEAST might have been much more strategically focused and less ad hoc. On the other hand, given the political exigencies in Jordan, perhaps this would not have made a difference.

As with Yemen, the AMIDEAST country director maintained strong contacts with a wide variety or organizations and individuals. This was particularly the case with Parliament, the judiciary and women's NGOs.

While in Jordan, the evaluation team had the opportunity to meet with the AMIDEAST project officer responsible for democracy activities in West Bank and Gaza. While the activities in West Bank/Gaza are not funded from the DDI project, the DDI unit was involved in all aspects of program design pertaining to the Public Law Project, which has involved a wide variety of lawyers and judges, as well as the general public, in consultations regarding legal development needs in the

area. The DDI unit also played a minor role in the design of a new bilateral project with the mission, the Institutional Development Project, which will strengthen the public administration capability of the Palestinian Authority.

AMIDEAST's West Bank/Gaza program should be commended for not allowing the political uncertainty of the Israeli/Palestinian peace accords to keep them from moving forward with work in Rule of Law. Although many thought it was premature to work in Rule of Law prior to appointment by the Palestinians of legal and judicial officials, and decisions concerning the form the new system would take, AMIDEAST nevertheless became active in this field at an early date and consequently helped encourage public and private sector dialogue on the ROL process. Its approach is a positive example of how to work on both the demand and supply side of ROL simultaneously -- strengthening civil society, while at the same time encouraging development of a legal and judicial system that will hopefully be more responsive to the needs of the citizens it is intended to serve.

H. The Question of Political Will

Political will is a final, critical issue that merits scrutiny with respect to both DDI in general and the particular country initiatives that the team reviewed in some detail. As emphasized in the aforementioned CDIE report regarding Rule of Law programming (Blair and Hansen 1994) and as applied to more general D/G work, it is essential to constantly examine whether the governments with which an organization works (or is trying to influence through the strengthening of civil society organizations) have the political will to change. Without such will, D/G programs are likely to yield minimal results. Some USAID staff have voiced concern that they are uncertain whether DDI was always working with officials key to democratic reform, and whether many of the beneficiaries of DDI-funded activities were more interested in the travel opportunities and equipment provided than they were in promoting democratic governance.

There is some merit to this concern, but the issue of whether and how well AMIDEAST assesses political will for reform, and of which governmental and nongovernmental leaders really possess it, nevertheless is a complicated matter. Regarding parliamentary development, for example, what AMIDEAST undertook in Yemen and suggested to USAID in Jordan have reflected a strategy that relies more on leaders of legislative staff than legislators themselves as agents of institutional change. As already noted, we are not in a position to reach any firm conclusions regarding whether this is the best legislative development strategy possible, but it does seem that AMIDEAST has put a good degree of thought into devising it--thought that implicitly or explicitly included an assessment of political will.

On the other hand, the broader question is whether an assessment of political will and related factors indicates that the parliament is even the best focus for investment in democratic development in, for example, Yemen. It seems clear that AMIDEAST/Yemen has not explored in any depth the need and possibilities for civil society programming that could make parliament accountable (though we return to the point that AMIDEAST/Washington reportedly was discouraged by USAID/Washington from working with media across the region, which could have constituted one prong of an effort to make the legislatures more accountable). Similarly, we are not sure whether there is a sufficient interest in the AMIDEAST/Yemen office in trying to help raise the status of women in Yemen, another potential priority (addressed in Section V of this report) for AMIDEAST work throughout the region.

What if an assessment of political will and related factors points AMIDEAST toward pursuing programs and issues that may be controversial within a host country and that could put AMIDEAST at odds with elements within and outside host-country governments? For that matter, to what extent is USAID willing to support such initiatives? Although this is not a stance most donors and NGOs like to take, in some countries it unfortunately is necessary in order to bring about democratic reform. Additionally, such a stance is easiest for groups that, unlike AMIDEAST, do not plan on maintaining a permanent presence in a country. Nevertheless, proceeding with appropriate political sensitivity and astuteness, in a number of countries around the globe USAID and other donors do support local human rights NGOs, environmental groups and other entities that may differ with powerful interest groups or with the policies of national governments. This demonstrates that it is not impossible to provide appropriate support under some circumstances. Though not the main thrust of DDI, AMIDEAST's work with women's NGOs indicates a willingness and initiative on the part of certain field staff members that should be encouraged.

In considering the impact of DDI on AMIDEAST field staff's capacities to assess political will and act on such assessments, we return to the nature of the project and how one goes about distinguishing real political will from empty rhetoric. Such an assessment involves investing a good amount of time in discussions with a range of informed individuals and in reading appropriate materials. As previously noted, it also involves "learning by doing" as much as possible--determining the progress and problems of current or previous activities regarding democratic development. Given the very limited funds available for such pilot projects under DDI and the fact that only 10 percent of field directors' time was devoted to the project (and that much of that time was concerned with tasks other than substantive matters), any shortcomings in assessments of political will become more understandable.

Of equal importance is the difference of opinion about whether and to what extent AMIDEAST could operate independently of USAID's guidance in devising potential DDI activities. To the extent that it could do so, it was more responsible for assessing political will. To the extent that it had to respond to implicit and explicit signals from USAID, that responsibility was more limited.

What is the bottom line regarding AMIDEAST and assessing political will under DDI? Its field staff have the country background and knowledge to undertake such assessments. They tended to do so in only a narrow sense, however, reflecting at best a very limited DDI impact on their capacities in this regard. The limitations on this impact in turn flow from the structure of DDI and the question of whether AMIDEAST was supposed to lead or follow USAID's thinking regarding democratic development.

I. Summary of Performance

How effective was DDI in strengthening AMIDEAST's capacity to design and implement democracy programs? The DDI Unit has developed a knowledge of democracy programming and has instituted a good working relationship with its country directors, who have benefited from this contact. The Washington-focused nature of DDI raises the question of whether too much of the

organization's expertise rests solely with the current DDI Program Director. Should the director leave AMIDEAST, how much expertise would be left?

In a related vein, a weakness of this effort has been the rather modest degree of direct hands-on experience by AMIDEAST field personnel in carrying out actual democratization activities, as opposed to coordinating consultant teams to carry out needs assessments and sector studies. In addition, structured training and exposure efforts to enhance field (and possibly all of AMIDEAST's) personnel capacities in D/G programming were minimal (though it should be noted that such efforts were not clearly articulated in the cooperative agreement). Finally, not all of the program (i.e., "seed") funds originally allocated under DDI were used, which is unfortunate because they would have funded pilot activities in the field.

On the other hand, it should be emphasized that in many important respects the DDI Unit made the best of a project structure that provided relatively limited program funds. It achieved some modest success in the process. It also adapted well to a situation in which a variety of non-AMIDEAST actors -- including USAID/Washington, USAID field missions and embassy staffs -- were involved in reviewing proposed DDI funded activities. While AMIDEAST is certainly not the only organization working with USAID that has been required to work with a variety of USAID and State Department staff on project activities, this evaluation of AMIDEAST's performance accordingly takes these added project management complexities into account.

IV. DDI PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY

As discussed in the previous section, the purpose statement of the DDI project anticipates AMIDEAST developing the organizational capacity to effectively design and implement democracy programs throughout the Near East. DDI's performance, with respect to developing this expertise and institutionalizing it within AMIDEAST, was examined in that section. However, with the DDI project drawing to a close, USAID's long-term objective of having AMIDEAST sustain and operationalize its democracy expertise through field program activities in the years ahead comes to the forefront. Outside of the strict parameters of the DDI project, this is how USAID will ultimately evaluate the success of its investment of $1.6 million in DDI.

How will AMIDEAST sustain its regional democracy promotion effort? To answer this question, it is important to review what AMIDEAST stated in its DDI proposal under the heading of "Program Sustainability":

> In many ways, the core grant sought in this proposal establishes the framework for the continuation of a long-term program to promote and strengthen democratic institutions. The successful implementation of program activities under this grant will serve as a demonstration project encouraging USAID mission and host country representatives to increase efforts on behalf of democratic institutional development. It will also lay valuable groundwork upon which subsequent projects can be built . . . AMIDEAST recognizes the need for a strategy for the funding of future projects. In large part, AMIDEAST anticipates that by the end of the three year term of the core grant, most, if not all, Near East USAID missions will have funds to allocate for democracy-building activities. In collaboration with USAID, AMIDEAST will develop grant proposals to missions seeking their support for future project activities.
>
> In addition, during the three year term of the grant, the program director will identify potential corporate and foundation donors to develop a base for successful solicitation of grants for future activities. A number of private foundations have supported international programming in this area, including the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Ford Foundation Regional Office in Cairo knows AMIDEAST well and has already been supportive of AMIDEAST institutional development activities in other areas.

Despite the hopes embodied in the above paragraph, AMIDEAST has not encountered substantial success in securing non-USAID funds for democratization activities. There are various reasons for this. One is that some European donors are reluctant to provide support to an American organization. Another is that some prospective funding sources already have an in-country presence that obviates the need to work through AMIDEAST. Third, sources such as the Ford Foundation and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung have provided AMIDEAST with "flow through" grants to local beneficiaries, but such grants do not sustain AMIDEAST itself. Finally, AMIDEAST's substantial and legitimate administrative and overhead costs needed to cover AMIDEAST/Washington support for field operations are viewed as unattractive by some foundations and donors.

AMIDEAST was required by USAID to submit a detailed sustainability plan. This plan would answer the question of how AMIDEAST will sustain (and hopefully expand) its democracy effort when the DDI project ends. According to USAID records, AMIDEAST apparently submitted various versions of a sustainability plan and these plans received mixed reviews in USAID. The final sustainability plan was submitted by AMIDEAST in July 1994. On the one hand, the plan represents a solid presentation. It effectively lays out the issue and outlines specific possibilities for financially maintaining AMIDEAST's democracy effort. Again, the plan is both pragmatic and realistic.

On the other hand, the sustainability plan does not prescribe a specific remedy for the problem. It merely lists a variety of reasonable possibilities, in some cases called scenarios, for dealing with the issue. For example, section II (entitled "Funding Sources") states:

> DDI envisions sustaining program activities through a variety of funding sources. These sources of support (outlined in Table 1) will include the following categories: A. Awarded contracts with final budgets; B. Awarded contracts with estimated budgets; C. Submitted

and/or pending Responses to U.S. Government Requests For Proposals (RFPs) and grants; D. Other U.S. Government and public funding sources; E. Other U.S. and non-U.S. funding sources.

For USAID to require AMIDEAST to develop a thoughtful sustainability plan was in keeping with an important facet of the DDI project. AMIDEAST needs to be well prepared for the day when the project will end. At the same time, there is probably no single solution or remedy for sustaining the democracy effort beyond DDI. Just as the sustainability plan points out, the effort hopefully will be maintained through a mix of resources that might become available to AMIDEAST. And what these resources are -- whether they be USAID mission bilateral agreements, other donor support or private donations -- cannot be foreseen at **this** time (though a perpetuation of past and current trends points toward continued reliance on USAID, given AMIDEAST's aforementioned difficulty with raising democratization funds from other sources). AMIDEAST will need to pursue them all and formulate its democracy program accordingly.

Since DDI project start-up, the sustainability of the DDI unit staff has been seen as relying on the staff's ability to begin charging their time to new project activities generated in the USAID missions. The staff accordingly have been implementing the following democracy and governance projects, funded by USAID Missions):

I. Judicial Education Project, funded by USAID/Egypt;
II. Legal Rights Project, funded by USAID/Egypt;
III. National Center for Judicial Studies Assessment, funded by USAID/Egypt;
IV. Yemen Parliament Training Project, funded by USAID/Yemen;
V. Public Law Project, funded by USAID/West Bank-Gaza under the Human Resources Development III project;
VI. Institutional Development Project, funded by USAID/West Bank-Gaza

In addition to these activities, the DDI staff have been involved in developing new business with USAID by responding to Requests for Proposals. In 1994-95, these staff developed the proposal for bid as a subcontractor (with Chemonics International) on the Decision Systems Support Project (DSSP) and as prime bidder (with the National Center for State Courts) on the Administration of Justice Support (AOJS) project, both issued by USAID/Egypt. The Chemonics/AMIDEAST bid on DSSP was not successful, but the AOJS proposal won in a very competitive process.

The development of the AOJS proposal involved a great investment of staff time and AMIDEAST financial resources. These costs, including DDI staff time, were paid by AMIDEAST reserve funds, and not charged against the DDI budget. Thus, this represents a significant part of AMIDEAST's contribution to the sustainability of the DDI unit.

This raises the question, however, of whether some resources devoted to preparing proposals should be put into pilot field activities that, over the long run, would enable AMIDEAST to gradually build up greater democratic development expertise and a relevant track record to present to USAID and other donors.

Whether or not the DDI Unit's current configuration is maintained by AMIDEAST leadership is not the central question. What is relevant is whether or not AMIDEAST expands this area of expertise throughout the organization, and is able to identify sufficient funding partners with which

to work. Through DDI, AMIDEAST is now in a good position to expand its expertise in democracy promotion. However, the road to financial sustainability will likely be uncertain. The leadership of AMIDEAST must be willing to make the long-term commitment necessary for building up the contacts and slowly securing the sufficient funding opportunities for making the democracy effort a viable and integral program component within AMIDEAST.

V. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

As DDI draws to a close, what lessons can USAID and AMIDEAST use to guide any future efforts to build up the capacities of intermediary organizations to carry out democratic development (DD) work. Of perhaps even greater importance, regardless of whether USAID works through intermediary organizations in the future, what programming priorities are most likely to effectively promote DD?

To address these questions, it would be useful to consider the experience of DDI, other USAID-supported initiatives regarding democratic development, and other organizations that have a long history of work in this field. Two of these are the Ford and Asia Foundations. Both differ substantially from AMIDEAST (as already noted, in the case of The Asia Foundation). Nevertheless, they do offer a few lessons worth considering.

We divide the discussion into four parts. The first relates to the best approaches through which democratic development, and related intermediary capacity-building, can proceed. The second concerns the substance of democratic development activities. We then offer a few thoughts on how the substance and approaches described here might relate to the challenging task of AMIDEAST raising funds for democratic development work. Finally, we address the issue of close-out activities that AMIDEAST could use to bolster its relevant capacities as DDI ends.

A. Approaches to Democratic Development Assistance: the Importance of Decentralization

1. Field-based Programming. Both the Ford and Asia Foundations are decentralized operations in which major programming decisions and many initiatives (including country-specific project proposals submitted to USAID by TAF) flow mainly from their field offices. While their home offices set general directions for their DD work and approve major country-specific grants, the field personnel are at the heart of their operations.

This approach has the obvious advantage of putting decisions in the hands of the staff members most in touch with the political, cultural, economic and other factors that affect DD programming. Almost as important with regard to capacity-building, it develops the DD expertise of field personnel by virtue of making them the point persons for work in this arena. They receive back-up and guidance from their home offices to the extent necessary, but play the central roles in formulating overall strategies and deciding what will be funded under those strategies.

Implications for USAID: Any future efforts to strengthen the capacities of intermediary organizations should focus heavily -- although not exclusively -- on building up the knowledge and experience of field-based personnel. In terms of project design, this translates into putting most of the funds for an intermediary into field operations, with relatively modest support for home office functions. This is certainly not to preclude a home office role in monitoring and strengthening field

capacities, since, as in AMIDEAST's own case, home office personnel can prove valuable. But the balance of efforts should be where the greatest need for expertise is -- in the field.

Implications for AMIDEAST: To the extent that resources permit, AMIDEAST should try to build on DDI by focusing its future DD efforts on country-specific initiatives that build up the expertise of its field personnel.

2. The Central Importance of Program Funds: Learning Through Experience

An important corollary of the field-based approach is that Ford and TAF personnel mainly learn through the experience of funding and otherwise working with various indigenous grantees and activities over time, rather than through intermediary staff training or information supplied by their home offices. While these latter devices are of some use, by far the most valuable lessons spring from actually supporting indigenous partners to undertake democratic development work. The lessons springing from this inductive approach help to identify which strategies, activities, indigenous institutions and individuals merit continued or increased support.

This has particular ramifications for TAF's relationship with USAID in the field, where the latter often funds unsolicited proposals submitted by the former. When a USAID mission provides grants to a TAF field office, it is doing more than simply supporting a range of proposed activities. In effect, the mission is recognizing and acknowledging TAF's expertise and experience in democratic development.

How is TAF able to maintain a considerable degree of independence from politically cautious embassies, USAID and other USG actors, while AMIDEAST, in its experience with DDI, has not? The difference is not simply TAF's non-USAID funds, for even in countries where its funding is mainly from USAID it retains a substantial level of autonomy. Nor is it simply a matter of the more open programming environment in much of Asia. Perhaps the single biggest factor is that, by virtue of its decentralized structure and direct contact with indigenous actors, TAF field personnel have an excellent understanding of the programming environment, constraints and opportunities for democratization. USAID mission staff, who are often occupied with a broader array of tasks, have grown to appreciate and rely on this expertise. TAF field staff rely on their home office very little for guidance on programming, writing proposals and conducting evaluations. The knowledge they develop means that they often need not conduct assessments or bring in consultants to develop and implement projects. In addition, TAF staff argue that it is in both the United States' and host countries' long-term interests for a U.S. organization to pursue democratic development work in an independent manner.

Implications for AMIDEAST: To the extent that resources permit, AMIDEAST's future DD work should focus more on field-based activities. This would take greater advantage of an organizational strength which contributed significantly to USAID launching the DDI cooperative agreement with AMIDEAST -- a network of experienced field personnel who in our experience and most USAID personnel's accounts are politically astute and familiar with their programming environments.

In addition, AMIDEAST should build on its current experience to initiate and involve "second-line" staff (i.e., professional staff members serving below the country director) in democratic development activities. It has done this, to good USAID reviews, in Egypt and West Bank/Gaza

for example. And in a much more preliminary way, the Yemen office recently set aside a limited amount of a staff member's time for participating in donor meetings concerning women in development. We applaud this particular initiative and hope that both the Yemen and other field offices will further pursue such in-house capacity-building. [4]

Finally, AMIDEAST can indirectly seek to build up its D/G capacities and impact by integrating democratic development concepts into its other programs as much as possible.

3. The Focus of Program Funds

In certain instances, DDI program funds and other USAID funds that resulted from DDI activities were used by AMIDEAST for assessment activities and U.S. study tours. But there are at least two important respects in which in-country, indigenous activities have an advantage over the use of consultants or international exchanges. The first relates back to the earlier point about learning by doing. To whatever extent indigenous entities can employ funds to undertake in-country activities, they clearly learn through doing. Of course, consultants and international exchanges also are supposed to serve educational functions, but the actual experience of carrying out one's job or assignment is the best learning tool -- whether one be a USAID employee, an AMIDEAST staff member, a government official or an NGO associate. Of perhaps even more fundamental importance, in-country activities actually stand to benefit the general population or specific segments of it.

The team should note that Ford and TAF, which primarily fund in-country, indigenous activities, tend to be primarily reactive in the sense that they respond to grantees' proposals. While USAID is certainly also reactive and has become more so in recent years due to added emphasis on indigenous participation in the design and implementation of its programs, USAID can also be proactive in that it designs projects to address needs it has identified. AMIDEAST often is more hands-on in terms of arranging training, consultants' visits and international exchanges. But there is much to be said for the reactive approach, in that it relies on indigenous initiative, leadership and dedication to identify problems and strive toward solutions. It is, in that sense, perhaps the most sustainable approach to take, because the intellectual impetus comes from within the society rather than from the development agency. It also is the most flexible, because it does not put in place projects that may not adapt to the swirling and unpredictable currents of most societies' political developments.

Implications for USAID: To the maximum extent possible when working with an intermediary organization, use of program funds for democratic development should be for in-country activities carried out by indigenous entities (though modest funding for staff training and other activities geared toward strengthening the intermediary also may be warranted). There will

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[4] It should be noted that DDI supported 10 percent of each AMIDEAST country director's time for activities pertaining to democratic development, but did not provide funding for second-line staff to participate in this work. The second-line staff time discussed here is supported by other sources.

of course be a need for the intermediary to decide on which activities merit support and to monitor the use of funds. Under many circumstances in the Near East there may well be a need for the intermediary to administer the funds, for political or legal reasons or because the financial capabilities of the indigenous actor are too limited. But the main goal should be to bolster indigenous capacities and democratic development through in-country activities that directly benefit both. Where an intermediary organization has developed sufficient knowledge of the problems it aims to address utilizing USAID support and the mechanisms for doing so, its proposal to USAID can in effect constitute an assessment, thus paring a potentially expensive and time-consuming stage from the process.

Implications for AMIDEAST: AMIDEAST should try to focus any democratic development funds it obtains in the future on in-country activities carried out by indigenous bodies, where such organizations are capable of independent operations.

4. Oversight of Intermediary Organizations: the Need for Flexibility

As previously noted, the course of DDI was affected and in many respects stymied by the panoply of actors who were involved in deciding what activities should be undertaken under the project and what USAID mission-funded projects should flow from DDI. While each of these parties had legitimate perspectives, in some respects the net impact was negative. In hindsight, it probably would have been much better for USAID to limit its management and direction of DDI and simply have held AMIDEAST accountable for results and progress at the end of DDI.

Implications for USAID: Whether USAID undertakes any future projects that seek to bolster an intermediary organization's democratic development capability or simply aim to support democratic development through an intermediary, the project design should maximize the flexibility and independence that it provides that organization. Perhaps the best way to do this is to: a) support the organization through a grant that (as already emphasized) concentrates funding in the field; and b) give the grantee's field offices the leeway to decide how to spend the funds, subject to a "no objection" review by the USAID missions. Whether this is possible under current USAID regulations that mandate Washington oversight of centrally awarded grants is unclear, but such simplicity is highly preferable if USAID wishes to achieve maximum impact. Such an approach and variations on it, which USAID has employed in sensitive programming environments elsewhere, preserves USAID's ultimate oversight while minimizing well-intentioned but ultimately counterproductive intrusion by a diversity of personnel with varying and even conflicting perspectives.

Of course, a fundamental consideration that hangs over this discussion is whether USAID in particular and the State Department to a lesser extent (through its embassies) are willing to relinquish to an intermediary tight control over the political development activities that USAID funds. We recognize that the fact that they have done so in other regions does not automatically mean that it can or should be done in the Near East. But it should be noted that democratic development programs pay a price for a lack of intermediary independence and flexibility.

B. The Substance of Democratic Development Assistance: An Emphasis on Civil Society Programming

1. Civil Society in General

Foreign assistance for democratic development in the Near East can and should draw on lessons from other regions where there is a broader and longer stream of experience. Some of those lessons highlight the importance of civil society programming. It is far beyond the scope of this report to comprehensively weigh the relative merits of working with nongovernmental as opposed to governmental bodies. But a brief review of democratic development experience suggests that an emphasis on civil society programming is warranted in the Near East in the future, to the extent that AMIDEAST is able to raise funds to do so. (Not having reviewed USAID's Asia/Near East democracy activities as a whole, we leave the Agency to draw its own conclusions on the extent to which the following discussion applies.)

A recent and pertinent analysis was conducted by USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE). Its 1994 report, Weighing in on the Scales of Justice, considers USAID's experience with legal systems development in several countries in Latin America and Asia, as well as those of the Ford and Asia Foundations in selected instances. Though careful to avoid universal judgments, the document concludes that Rule of Law (ROL) strategies oriented toward civil society usually hold more promise than those that focus on technical assistance for governmental institutions:

[M]uch of the analysis in this report suggests that a paradigm featuring a [government-oriented] `technical fix' or engineering approach to institutional change is inappropriate for understanding and prescribing the process of ROL reform. Rather, an approach that leans heavily on the insights of political economy and emphasizes constituency and coalition building [through work with NGOs, media and public opinion polling] would be more suitable for envisaging and designing ROL strategies. (Blair and Hansen 1994, 51)

Former State Department attorney Thomas Carothers makes a broader but related argument in his 1991 book, In the Name of Democracy, arguing that a political development assistance strategy oriented toward governmental institutions "tends to ignore the profoundly antidemocratic underlying political and economic structures" and to avoid involvement with many "sectors of society that have long been disenfranchised and must be incorporated into a participatory political process for democracy to take root." (1991, 224-5)

Before continuing, we should emphasize that we need not necessarily endorse the CDIE and Carothers conclusions to highlight the limited implications we wish to draw for the purposes of this paper: a future emphasis on civil society programming in the Near East seems warranted for AMIDEAST. It is not our intent to question decisions that have already been made, but rather to suggest that support for governmental institutions be complemented to a greater extent by work with NGOs and media.

One major factor that accounts for this track record is that civil society programming tends to be "interest-based." That is, to adapt Carothers' point, interest-based programming works with NGOs that in turn work with or on behalf of populations that have a concrete economic or other

interest in seeing laws enforced, policies reformed and/or corruption curtailed. Therefore, the real impetus for such work springs from such NGOs and their partner populations. Such democratic development programming is the equivalent of responding to what in broader development terminology is sometimes referred to as "felt need." In emphasizing what it calls a constituency and coalition building strategy, the CDIE report accordingly recognizes that judicial and other governmental leaders in many societies may lack a requisite dedication to reform, or may even have interests running counter to it. The report accordingly relies on groups that have a concrete interest in positive change to pressure such leaders.

But the logic underlying an emphasis on civil society programming reaches beyond the CDIE report's rationale. One consideration is that assistance for legislatures and judiciaries should be seen as just a partial means toward the end of ensuring that those institutions work to the benefit of a country's entire population, especially the majority that is economically, socially and politically marginalized. To the considerable extent that narrow elite interests dominate government institutions in many developing countries, improving those institutions' technical capacities and formal structures may do little to serve society at large unless there are concomitant changes in the social and economic infrastructure of society.

It was for this reason that, even while endorsing AMIDEAST's work with parliamentary staff, a leading Yemeni political scientist highlighted for the team the importance of working to bolster civil society so that Yemen (and its democracy) could begin to evolve beyond its current domination by the military and tribal figures. Technical improvements may only modify the nature of intra-elite competition and cooperation, but not in any manner that broadens effective political participation to include the rest of society. Strengthening appropriate civic groups and interests can, over the long run, make such institutions and elites more accountable in terms of both the honesty with which they conduct their official functions and the degree to which they adopt and implement policies that serve the broad public interest and that benefit the marginalized majority.

Thus, the argument is that development of technical capacities really only takes on significance to the extent that broader societal changes make those wielding those capacities accountable. The team does not deny the potential importance of improving governmental institutions' technical capabilities or the work that AMIDEAST and USAID have undertaken thus far in this vein. Rather, the point is that such activities should be complemented, at the very least, by equivalent work regarding civil society.

None of this is to deny the democratic development implications of civil society programming that takes place outside the context of a formal democratic development program or the experience of USAID and AMIDEAST in this regard. An important variation on this theme is that offered by the head of an NGO involved with family planning in Yemen. In educating women and men regarding this subject, her group also highlights the rights of women regarding their bodies and contraception decisions. It certainly is not explicitly or mainly a democratic development activity. But it aims in part to provide beneficiaries with more control over the issues that affect them most by informing them of their rights regarding those issues. In fact, democratic development experience indicates that some of the most effective legal rights and advocacy activities are those that build on or are integrated with more basic development programs, such as community organizing, livelihood development and micro-loan activities.

A final thought regarding democratic development experience regards the role that universities have played. Many students in developing countries have formative professional experiences in

undergraduate or graduate school that influence them to subsequently go into NGO work or other forms of public service.

Implications for AMIDEAST: The obvious implication of the preceding discussion is that an emphasis on civil society programming seems warranted. In making this suggestion, the team recognizes that in the Near East: a) government control over press and NGO activities is generally more restrictive than other parts of the developing world; b) civil society is in a relatively rudimentary phase of development in many nations; and c) fundamentalist forces play a prominent role in civil society in some nations. We, furthermore, respect the initiatives that USAID missions and AMIDEAST field offices already have taken regarding civil society both within and outside the context of formal democratic development work, and do not pretend that the ideas presented here are totally new or necessarily adaptable to every country in the region.

While there is no short or sweeping answer that addresses the constraints identified above, we can offer a few preliminary options and perspectives at this juncture. One such perspective is to abandon a categorization of activities that divides, for example, efforts to assist legal systems, legislatures and civic organizations. The CDIE report does this by suggesting a civil society-oriented strategy for rule of law programs. A similar argument can be made regarding parliamentary development, if it is conceived as developing legislatures that are responsive and accountable to their general publics, and not just fortifying their technical capacities.

Programming that proceeds in this vein might aim to educate legislators and their staffs regarding their responsibility to operate open, responsive and accountable institutions and the very legitimate roles of NGOs and the press with respect to parliamentary operations. One way of getting this ball rolling might be joint training activities that bring together representatives of all of these sectors.

In those societies where the legal, political and programming environments are sufficiently open and the NGO sector sufficiently sophisticated, core support for, e.g., NGO staffs, office expenses and other costs could be provided. To the extent that NGOs are not sufficiently financially adept at handling such core support on their own, AMIDEAST offers the advantage for USAID and other donors of administering such funding as an intermediary body.

USAID naturally has legitimate concerns regarding the sustainability of this kind of assistance, but an aforementioned point merits repetition: most organizations and individuals learn by doing more than through training. In addition, a key consideration is sustainability of impact, not of the organization receiving funding. Whether an organization lasts beyond the duration of USAID support is less important than whether it brings concrete benefits to target populations and builds the capacity of its staff to undertake similar work in the future. In the Ford and Asia Foundations' experience, for example, individuals whose NGOs they have supported have built on this professional development to go on to head larger organizations, serve in important government posts or, in fact, act as consultants to USAID.

How can donors address the twin problems of repressive state activity and the rudimentary state of NGOs in many Near Eastern nations, especially if these combine to make core support for NGOs problematic in a given country?

One relatively safe vehicle is exposure to other NGOs abroad. AMIDEAST has taken a good step in this direction under DDI by organizing in Jordan a workshop for women regarding political participation. But another option is for individuals from the more sophisticated NGOs to venture outside the region to learn about strategies that colleagues in other developing nations have adopted. Representatives from less sophisticated NGOs could do the same within the region. And to adopt a very useful suggestion offered by the USAID Mission Director in Yemen, the more sophisticated NGO leaders within the region could visit their colleagues with less experience to appreciate the environments within which those colleagues operate and to offer appropriate advice. Given AMIDEAST's strength and experience regarding exchange programs, these types of activities might be particularly appropriate for it to undertake.

A related approach could include working with universities to stimulate research [5], new ideas and, most of all, student involvement in whatever activities governments do not find threatening. Visits by NGO leaders from abroad also should target university campuses. These are the institutions that will produce the leaders with the most creative and energetic approaches to addressing their countries' problems. For them to get a sense of strategies that have been tried in other countries would expand their intellectual horizons in some very practical ways.

We acknowledge that the unsophisticated state of many Near Eastern NGOs and the fact that they operate in restrictive environments means that work regarding civil society necessarily aims for long-term impact. But this also is most definitely the case with legislative and judicial programming. The computer training conducted for parliamentary staff members in Yemen is but the first stage of a process that could take a generation to yield a technically adept institution. The time frame for NGO development, so that civic institutions reach a point where they have a real impact on policy formulation and implementation, may not require such a long-term investment in any one organization.

Implications for USAID and AMIDEAST:

Separately or together, USAID and AMIDEAST should explore ways of bridging the gap between socioeconomic and democratic development programming. This is by no means to suggest that AMIDEAST itself launch socioeconomic development initiatives. Rather, where USAID or other donors have done so, AMIDEAST might explore how it could build democratic development efforts on the foundations established by such initiatives.

Another point worth mentioning regarding democratic development work, but particularly in the context of civil society programming, is that of intermediary and indigenous organizations attributing USAID support to activities they conduct. We must distinguish here between acknowledging and advertising such support. Of course it is necessary to be absolutely open about the origins of funding. But indigenous organizations sometimes can suffer unfair recriminations from their governments and other NGOs if they accept USG money. Furthermore, they sometimes will work with an intermediary organization, as opposed to an official USG entity, precisely because they know and trust that organization's personnel, and because it is politically safer for

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[5] One example of such research might pertain to progressive interpretations of Islamic law. We discuss this issue subsequently in this report, in the context of addressing the status of women.

them to do so. The upshot is that USAID should be sensitive to the fact that indigenous NGOs sometimes walk a fine political line, and that they can be honest about USAID funds without advertising the fact.

2. The Central Importance of Promoting the Role and Rights of Women

As many within USAID and AMIDEAST already realize, a central aspect of an increased emphasis on civil society programming and on democratic development generally is addressing the status of women. To what extent this should be a priority merits attention at this point because views on this matter vary within both organizations. That women deserve equal rights and that they lack them in the Near East (as well as elsewhere) of course is widely acknowledged within both organizations. But the degree to which limited democracy funds should be allocated between broader democratic development activities as opposed to women's activities is a complicated matter involving a host of policy determinations. (As with the Agency's democratization activities, we have not reviewed USAID's Asia/Near East overall activities regarding the status of women, and accordingly leave it to the Bureau to draw its own conclusions on the extent to which the following discussion applies to it.)

Before further exploring this issue, we should emphasize that USAID and AMIDEAST personnel we consulted in our limited review of their democratic development activities demonstrated a commitment to improving the status of women, so we are by no means raising the issue to criticize them. In fact, the team found particular knowledge of and dedication to the role and rights of women on the part of USAID/Yemen, where the Mission Director displayed an impressive grasp of programming possibilities within Yemen in particular and the region as a whole, and where the Women in Development in-house consultant evinced a similar level of expertise and thoughtfulness. Similarly, USAID/Jordan and AMIDEAST directors in Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco have pursued the issue with significant dedication.

Nevertheless, democratic development's relationship to the status of women merits scrutiny here because the status of women has not been as central to DDI as parliamentary and judicial programming. The fact that this appears due to USAID decisions and advice to AMIDEAST is far less important than where the organizations should go from here and why.

Why should the status of women be a central consideration regarding democratic development in the Near East? One reason pertains to the aforementioned distinction between two types of priorities for democratic development assistance. As previously noted, there is no guarantee that improved technical capacities will necessarily make government institutions any more responsive to the interests of marginalized groups or in fact to the interests of the majority of the population.

A second reason springs from the fact that it is hard to conceive of an adequately functioning democracy excluding half of the population from adequate participation, both in terms of formal democratic structures (e.g., parliament, the courts) and in terms of realizing its rights with respect to the issues that most affect it.

Finally, a society that constrains half the population from political participation retards its own economic and social development. Though a complex dynamic of development sees women participating more once their socioeconomic status improves, the reverse also is true: enhanced

political participation favorably affects the adoption and implementation of laws and policies that in turn enable women to improve their material and social situations.

Implications for AMIDEAST: Many of the considerations already cited regarding civil society programming pertain to the status of women. In addition, the practical reality is that in some Near Eastern societies women's organizations represent the most coherent NGOs, which contributes to making them the most logical groups with which to work.

An interesting development is that women's groups in Jordan, Yemen and even Iran are trying to utilize Islamic law to the benefit of females. While it does have elements that provide for inferior treatment of women, much of the discrimination practiced against them employs harsh or even incorrect interpretations of the Islamic law. Thus, the aforementioned family planning NGO in Yemen is working with sympathetic clerics to promulgate the view that women should have a say in contraceptive decisions. In terms of research, training and advocacy, there accordingly seems to be room for AMIDEAST to assist indigenous groups that favor similarly liberal interpretations of a corpus of religious law that often is flatly and wrongly dismissed in the West as inevitably regressive.

C. The Financial Imperative

While we have cited the Ford and Asia Foundations as providing relevant democratic development experience, the fact remains that AMIDEAST is in a fundamentally different financial boat. Unlike these institutions, AMIDEAST's funding is solely project-related. AMIDEAST, therefore, has no pool of independent resources that it can devote to project activities. It is a business, albeit a nonprofit business, that survives not by unrestricted remittances. The only time that AMIDEAST can invest substantial funds of its own in a new activity is when and if that activity can pay for itself. The problem that these financial facts of life pose for AMIDEAST is that it risks being identified as just another USAID-dependent organization, rather than a development organization with field offices that lend it a special role regarding democratization.

With DDI coming to an end, how and why should AMIDEAST pursue democratic development work in the absence of project funds?

One avenue is to utilize the very limited non-project resources it has at its disposal (for new business development) to support local, second-line staff involvement along the lines of the Yemen office's recent move to allow a staff member to learn about donor involvement and other activities regarding women in development. Such staff time is much less expensive than that of the country director, and the investment can contribute to raising AMIDEAST field capacity in a field that partly overlaps with democratic development.

A related approach is to propose field-based activities to foundations and other donors that might be in a position to fund such work, but that balk at the substantial costs involved with international exchanges and other programs that have heavy home office involvement. AMIDEAST's Washington-derived costs are perfectly legitimate expenses, but can be relatively high (in absolute terms) because they involve home office staff time and other home office costs. Such costs are not the only reason that AMIDEAST has had difficulty raising democratic development funds from non-USAID sources, but they are one factor. In contrast, field-base

activities are relatively inexpensive and, as previously emphasized, often preferable in terms of both democratic development and building AMIDEAST capacity.

If AMIDEAST is able to generate even modest funds for ongoing democratic development work, it conceivably may be able to later turn to USAID field missions with instructive experience and powerful arguments regarding what it proposes to do in the democratic development arena.

Despite the constraints that AMIDEAST faces, the rationale for undertaking field-focused DD work is two-fold. First, it can be viewed as an investment that could lead to larger donor funding. In addition, while AMIDEAST is a business, it also is a development organization. To the extent that it sees great value in promoting democratic development, the status of women and human rights in the Near East, the investment in field-based work becomes more worthwhile.

D. Potential Close-Out Activities

A modest level of funding remains in DDI for a close-out activity that could help wrap up the project and build toward the future. What options should AMIDEAST explore in this regard?

1. Seminar on the Status of Women. Given the importance of the status of women as an issue that merits attention in the Near East and the possibility of donor support eventually flowing to AMIDEAST work on this subject, it might be worthwhile for AMIDEAST to organize a close-out seminar for country directors and appropriate second-line field staff regarding the interface between women in development and democratic development.

2. Workshop on Democratic Development. AMIDEAST could convene a workshop in which experienced democratic development practitioners offer ideas and feedback to AMIDEAST field staff regarding democratic development. Should funds be more limited or the availability of qualified second-line staff be sufficient, AMIDEAST could organize a workshop designed to help bring these individuals up to speed regarding democratic development work.

3. Workshop on Legal Systems Development. Consistent with this report's recommendation that an emphasis be placed on civil society programming in the future, AMIDEAST could convene appropriate field staff for a workshop that draws on the aforementioned CDIE report, reviews whether and to what extent it is applicable to the Near East, and stimulates other thinking and strategies for promoting more responsive legal systems and stimulating the development of dynamic legal services NGOs.

4. A USAID-AMIDEAST Exchange of Views. One relatively low-cost event that should constitute a valuable close-out activity for DDI is a meeting or even a retreat at which USAID and AMIDEAST Washington personnel exchange perspectives on some of the issues that have affected or can affect the relationship between the two organizations. Four of the most salient issues revolve around the following series of questions:

a. To what extent did AMIDEAST assume the role of a contractor/service provider in DDI, rather than acting as a grantee pursuing its own program initiatives with USAID support? And, to what extent should it have taken a consistent initiative? One point of view holds that AMIDEAST was insufficiently aggressive in setting its own agenda through DDI, that it acted as a contractor rather than as an independent partner. Another point of view maintains that such a course was

inevitable for AMIDEAST, given the signals it received from USAID/Washington and the need to be responsive to USAID field missions in order to generate new projects.

b. To what extent should AMIDEAST have expected USAID missions to launch democracy programs that would make use of AMIDEAST and DDI, thereby sustaining the latter? One point of view is that this was implicit in the cooperative agreement or the negotiations leading up to it. Another is that AMIDEAST was supposed to use DDI to leverage funds that could possibly but not definitely include mission support.

c. How much potential is there for AMIDEAST to generate non-USAID funds for democratic development work? One point of view is that AMIDEAST has been insufficiently aggressive in seeking out other donors, that it should look to such sources as Arab Americans for support and to organizations such as PACT and CARE to learn about how they creatively stretch their resources and/or raise funds, and that some of the resources it puts into proposals and other aspects of new business development might be better invested in modest pilot activities that over time would build up AMIDEAST's democratic development experience and track record. Another asserts that AMIDEAST is very constrained in terms of its ability to stretch its resources, and that it has explored funding alternatives to USAID to no avail.

d. How much flexibility can USAID provide a grantee like AMIDEAST? One view maintains that it is unrealistic and even naive to think that USAID can give an intermediary organization a free hand regarding the sensitive political judgments involved with democratic development programming. Another argues that some USAID missions have done so already without suffering any great political harm, and that in any event such flexibility is crucial to successful democratic development work. Yet a third perspective is that intermediary flexibility is likely to vary from country to country, hinging on political sensitivities and the role of the USG in the country.

Consultation Schedule
DDI Evaluation Team

Washington:

Monday, 20 March 1995
AMIDEAST DDI Orientation
Joe Schechla, director, DDI
Diana Kamal, senior vice president for programs, AMIDEAST
Nagat El-Sanabary, WID consultant, USAID, ANE/SEA
John Anderson, USAID, ANE/SEA

Tuesday, March 21, 1995
Roberto Figueredo, USAID, G/DG
Jennifer Windsor, USAID, G/DG
James Dempsey, USAID, ANE/RI
Herb Blank, USAID, ANE/RI
Barry MacDonald, USAID, ANE/RI/SI

Wednesday, March 22, 1995
Amb. Robert S. Dillon, president, AMIDEAST
James McCloud, sevior vice president, AMIDEAST
William Cole, USAID, ENI
Jerry Hyman, USAID, G/DG

Sana`a':

Sunday, March 26, 1995
Aziz Alhadi, AMIDEAST/Yemen country director

Monday, March 27, 1995
William McKinney, USAID/Yemen mission director
Abdul `Ali al-Shami, FSN, USAID mission
AMIDEAST/Yemen:
- Issam Sooqi
- Najib al-Sharafi
- Tawfeeq al-Dubhani
- Suhair al-Amari

Tuesday, March 28, 1995
Aziz Alhadi, country director, AMIDEAST/Yemen
Bilqis al-Shar`i, , Department of Educational Foundation
Jamila al-Shar`i, Yemen Family Care Association
John Kincannon, USIS director
Marianne Nolte, first secretary, Development Section, Royal Dutch Embassy
Joyce Davidson, WID consultant, USAID/Yemen

Wednesday, March 29, 1995
William McKinney, director, USAID/Yemen mission director
Abdul `Ali al-Shami, program office, USAID/Yemen
Qat Chew, Education Committee Chamber, Parliament
Senior parliament staff and MPs from the General People's Congress, Reform Party (*Islah*) and the Yemeni Socialist Party

Thursday, March 30, 1995
Naji' Harazi, journalist, *al-Thawra* newspaper
Judge Ahmad Muhammad al-Shami, representative of *al-Haq* Party, vice president of Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, Democracy and Civil Liberties
Muhammad `Abdullah al-Mutawakkil, professor of political science, University of San`a', member of Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, Democracy and Civil Liberties
Outing to Kawkaban village

Amman
Sunday, April 2, 1995
Janine El Tal, AMIDEAST/Jordan country director
Dr. Mufleh al-Qudah, director, Jordanian Judicial Institute
Dr. Saleh al-Zu`bi, advisor, Prime Ministry, and former secretary-general to the Jordan Parliament

Monday, April 3, 1995
Lamis Andoni, journalist, *Christian Science Monitor, Middle East International*
Dinner at El Tal home with: Dr. Arwa Aamary (president, Center for Women's Studies), Dr. Tayseer & (Mrs.) Hind Abdel Jaber (president, Business and Professional Women's Club), P.E. & Mrs. Balakrishna (program officer, USAID/Amman), Camille Baronne (USIS), Robert & Mrs. Beacroft (DCM, U.S. Embassy), H.E. Hisham El Tal (minister of justice), Yasir and Janine El Tal, Robert Hansen (program officer, USAID/Amman), William & Mrs. Jordan (political officer, U.S. Embassy), Rami & Linda Khoury (journalist/publisher), Peter & Mrs. Kovach (PAO, USIS), Cherie Lenzen (USAID contractor), Alain & Mrs. Macnamara (executive director, Fulbright), Wm. T. Oliver (mission director, USAID/Amman), Dr. Mufleh Qudah (director, Jordanian Judicial Institute), Jonathan Rice (CAO, USIS), Diana Swain (deputy director, USAID/Amman), Pamela Woodward (JOT, USIS), H.E. Dr. Saleh & Mrs. al-Zu`bi (advisor, Prime Ministry).

Tuesday, April 4, 1995
H.E. Hisham El Tal, minister of justice
Will Jordan, political officer, U.S. Embassy
Regina Hansen, political section, U.S. Embassy
Donald Reese, program officer, USAID/Amman
P.E. Balakrishna, program officer, USAID/Amman
Diana Swain, deputy director, USAID/Amman
Robert Hansen, program officer, USAID/Amman
Dr. Arwa Aamary, Center for Women's Studies

Wednesday, April 5, 1995
Butheina Jardaneh Sal`ous, Business and Professional Women's Club
Amal Nashashibi, assistant director, AMIDEAST/Jerusalem, coordinator of the Public Law Project
Asma Khader, attorney and president of the Union of Women in Jordan

Thursday, April 6, 1995

Amal Nashashibi, assistant director, AMIDEAST/Jerusalem, coordinator of the Public Law Project
Democracy and Human Rights Committee, U.S. Embassy (canceled)

Persons Interviewed by Telephone:
Susan Buret, AMIDEAST/Morocco
James Coffman, AMIDEAST/Tunisia
William Cole, USAID/ENI
Pirie Gall, USAID/ANE/RI
James Graham, (formerly) USAID/Tunisia
Jerry Hyman, USAID/G/DG
Ghassan Jamous, USAID/Lebanon
Ana Klenicki, USAID/Egypt
Michael Oreste, U.S. Embassy/Morocco
Karen Turner, USAID/Jerusalem
Susan Ziadeh, USIS/Jerusalem (formerly AMIDEAST DDI Director)

DDI END-OF-PROJECT EVALUATION
Comprehensive List of DDI/AMIDEAST Publications and Reports:
Governance and Democracy

DDI/Jordan:

"The Representative Assembly in Contemporary Jordan: Its Role and Its Needs" (Washington: AMIDEAST, October 1992)

"A Proposal for a Needs Assessment of Jordan's Judicial Institute" [submitted to USAID/Jordan, November 1, 1994)

DDI Lebanon:

Postwar Institutional Development in Lebanon: An Assessment for Foreign Assistance (February 1992)

DDI/Morocco:

"A Proposal to Conduct a Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment in Morocco" (Washington: AMIDEAST, December 1991)

"A Proposal to Conduct a Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment in Morocco" (Washington: AMIDEAST, May 1992)

"A Proposal to Conduct a Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment in Morocco" (Washington: AMIDEAST, August 1992)

"A Proposal to Conduct a Legal and Judicial Sector Assessment in Morocco" (Washington: AMIDEAST, December 1992)

"An Integrated Approach to Democratization in Morocco" (Rabat: AMIDEAST, 22 November 1994)

An Integrated Program to Support Democratization in Morocco (November 22, 1994)

DDI/Tunisia:

"Tunisian Chamber of Deputies Study / Observation Tour Final Report" (January 1994)

"The Woman and Marriage," AFTURD [in Arabic and French]

"The Woman and Divorce," AFTURD [in Arabic and French]

"The Woman and the Workplace," AFTURD [in Arabic and French].

DDI/Yemen:

A Survey of Yemen's Legal/judicial and Democratic Institutions (August 1992)

"Report on the Needs of the Parliamentary Library in Yemen" (June 1993)

DDI Regional:

"Regional NGO Workshop: Promoting Women's Participation in Governance" (June 1994)

Needs Assessment: National Center for Judicial Studies (Egypt)

"Technical Assessment of the Egyptian National Centre for Judicial Studies" (Cairo: AMIDEAST, March 1994)

Public Law Project (West Bank/Gaza Strip):

The role of the judiciary in the transition period:

- Abu Ghazalah, Kazim. "*al-Majlis al-Qadha'i al-`Ali*" [The Higher Judicial Council]";
- Abu Ghazalah, Tawfiq. "*al-Qidha' al-Nidhami fi al-Marhala al-Intiqaliyya fi Ghaza wa Ariha*'" [The Judicial System in the Transitional Phase in Gaza and Jericho];
- Khashan, `Ali. "*al-Riqaba al-Qadha'iyya `ala I`mal al-Idara*" [Judicial Review of Administrative Functions];
- Sha`ban, Ibrahim. "*al-Riqaba al-Qadha'iyya `ala Dasturiyyat al-Qawanin*" [Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Laws];

Landlord/tenant law:

- Bustami, Basim. "*al-Ta`dilat allati Turat `ala Qanun al-Malikin wa al-Must`ajarin fi al-Urdun*" [Revisions to the Landlord/tenant Law in Jordan];
- Ghuzlan, `Abdullah. "*Nitaq Tatbiq Qanun al-Malikin wa al-Must`ajarin fi al-Dhafa al-Gharbiyya*" [The Limits to Applying the Landlord/tenant Law in the West Bank];

• al-Husseini, Faisal. "*Qanun Taqyid al-Ijarat fi Ghaza*" [The Law Restricting Rents in Gaza];
• al-Jallad, Farid. "*Asbab al-Takhliyya fi al-Dhafa al-Gharbiyya*" [Reasons for Eviction in the West Bank];
• Mashhur, Nabil. "*Ziyadat al-Ijar fi al-Dhafa al-Gharbiyya hasab al-Amr al-`Askari Raqam 1271*" [Rent Increases in the West Bank according to Military Order No. 1271];
• Nasar, Darwish. "*Qanun Hamiyat al-Must`ajar fi Isra'il*" [The Law for the Protection of the Tenant in Israel]";
• Salim, `Imad. "*Huquq wa Wajibat al-Malikin wa al-Mist`ajarin fi al-Dhafa al-Gharbiyya*" [Rights and Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants in the West Bank];
• al-Sarraf, Faraj. "*Huquq wa Wajibat al-Malikin wa al-Must`ajarin fi Qita` Ghaza*" [Rights and Responsibilities for Landlords and Tenants in Gaza];
• al-Wahaydi, Darwish. "*Asbab al-Takhliyya fi Qita` Ghaza*" [Reasons for Eviction in the Gaza Strip];

"Directory of Legal-oriented Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (October 1994)

"Compilation of legal/judicial development Efforts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (October 1994).